



CITY OF OAKLAND

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**TO:** PAC

**FROM:** Omar Daza-Quiroz, Acting Deputy Chief  
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

**SUBJECT:** Automated License Plate Reader  
(ALPR) Annual Report

**DATE:** APRIL 17, 2026

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## **Background**

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Oversight Following City Council Approval requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by PAC, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to City Council. The PAC shall recommend to City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs, and civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

Department General Order I-12 titled *Automated License Plate Readers* (DGO I-12) is the policy that provides guidance on the use of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) at the Oakland Police Department. This DGO was reviewed by the PAC and approved by City Council on July 16<sup>th</sup>, 2024. An updated version of I-12 is attached to this report (Attachment B) for review and request of approval from the PAC.

## **2025 Annual Report Details**

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

### ***How the Technology is Used***

The Oakland Police Department (OPD) utilizes Flock Safety (Flock) camera technology to power its Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system. These cameras are mounted on pre-existing city infrastructure, such as light poles or traffic light poles, or they can be mounted utilizing a pole provided by Flock. Once mounted, these cameras take still photos which focus on a vehicle to ensure a clear view of the license plate.

The Oakland Police Department primarily utilizes the Flock system in two ways.

1. To assist in active criminal investigations which have just occurred. The OPD will utilize ALPR to search where a crime just occurred. OPD personnel can enter a vehicle's license plate (if one was provided) or enter a partial license plate (if one was provided) or search a camera location (if no license plate is provided) and attempt to identify the suspect vehicle(s) or vehicle(s) of interest. The vehicle's images are then distributed to OPD Officers via interdepartmental email in attempt to locate and stop and detain any occupant(s). These vehicles are then hot listed via Flock in order to notify/alert officers when the vehicle passes an ALPR. Officers can respond to the location of the alert(s) in an attempt to locate the vehicle.


2. To assist in follow-up criminal investigations which have occurred in the past (30) thirty days. OPD will search ALPR locations of areas where crimes have occurred to attempt to identify vehicle(s) of interest that were involved in previous crimes. When vehicle(s) of interest are identified, images are distributed via interdepartmental email in attempt to locate and stop and identify any occupant(s). These vehicle(s) are then hot listed in order to notify/alert officers when the vehicle(s) passes an ALPR. Officers can respond to the location in attempt to locate the vehicle.

**Type and Quantity of Data**

Photos of vehicle license plates are the primary data that is collected. This data is retained for 30 days, as required by DGO I-12.

**Figure A** below shows the amount of license plate reads, month over month in 2025 and shows in comparison to 2024. Please note that the same license plate can be read multiple times a day, if that license plate passes by the same or different cameras during its travel. From July 2024 through December 2024, there was a total of 188,964,975 license plate reads by Flock cameras assigned to OPD in the City of Oakland. 2025 was the first full year OPD utilized Flock cameras and there was a total of 638,747,333 license plate reads by Flock cameras assigned to OPD in the City of Oakland.

*Figure A*




For hotlists, there was a total of 1,099,837 vs 247,024 (2024) hotlist alerts in 2025, with 657,345 vs 212,625 (2024) alerting from an official hotlist, 111,587 vs. 5,799 (2024) alerting from an OPD custom hotlist, and 330,905 vs 28,600 (2024) custom hot list alerts created by other departments that utilized OPDs Flock images. As a reminder 2024 year-end stats were from July through December 31, 2024 and 2025 stats were from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2025 – December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2025. his data is visualized in **Figure B** below.

*Figure B.*

## 2024 Data

### Hot List Hits Report

Summary of hot list hits over time. Updates are made every 24 hours.




## 2025 Data

### Hotlist Hits Report

Summary of hotlist hits over time. Updates are made every 24 hours.

Enter Print Mode



In both 2024 and 2025, OPD's top five alert types were stolen plate (620,331 vs. 187,129 (2024)), non-owned custom hotlist alert, which is an alert created by another agency using Flock and shared with OPD 528,600 vs.330,905 (2024), stolen vehicle 33,235 vs.23,179 (2024), an alert from an OPD custom hotlist (111,587 vs. 75,799 (2024)) and felony vehicles 92,326 vs 3,779 (2024).

Due to the overwhelming number of alerts for “stolen vehicle” and “stolen plate” compared to the other types of alerts and the staffing and resources within the department, alerts for these types remain deactivated. Flock is still working to enable a feature to allow selective notification of these types of alerts during lower call volume hours, but at this time no such feature exists. At this time OPD cannot respond to such alerts given the number of calls for service (e.g., priority calls and emergency calls) OPD receives daily.

When alerts for felony vehicles are received, OPD Officers will either broadcast or distribute email notifications via interdepartmental emails in order for officers to respond to the location and conduct an area check. At times, OPD will also request plain clothes officers, and/or air support (Argus) to respond to the location to assist with locating the felony vehicle(s). In 2024, with the rollout of Flock, a multitude of officers within OPD were provided ALPR training and been provided access; THESE officers range from Patrol, Community Resource Officers (CRO), Crime Reduction Team (CRT), Ceasefire (CF), Walking Units, Argus, Traffic, and Investigations. OPD has continued to increase the number of trained officers with access to the system. At this time approximately 350 members of OPD have received the required training.

Custom hot lists can have a variety of responses. They range from responding to conducting an enforcement action or identifying the reads and alerts to further one’s investigation.

Outside agencies do not always provide OPD with a response or notify OPD of their hot lists and outcomes. Each agency has access to their own Success Stories feature via the Flock ‘Edit Outcome’ link; which allows agencies to document their enforcement actions. OPD does not have access to any agency’s success stories, as such outside agencies do not have access to OPD’s success stories.

Quarterly, there are Flock meetings where Bay Area agencies come together to discuss success stories and improvements which can be made to the Flock products and areas where they would like to see the system improved. At times, outside agencies will share their success stories, such as the one listed here:

- OPD responded to a Flock alert for a felony shooting vehicle responsible for a shooting in the City of Berkeley. Officers were able to locate the vehicle and initiated a vehicle pursuit. The OPD Helicopter (Argus) took over the pursuit and continued to follow the vehicle throughout Oakland. Two subjects were eventually detained after exiting the vehicle. A search of the suspect vehicle was conducted, and (3) three firearms and a large quantity of ammunition was located in the vehicle. Both subjects were arrested for multiple felony charges as well as outstanding felony warrants.
- OPD officers responded to a Flock alert for a Richmond Carjacking vehicle located in Oakland. Due to the real time alerting within Flock OPD officers along with Richmond PD officers were able to respond to the area and were able to safely apprehend the driver of the vehicle without incident.

B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

The Oakland Police Department has shared our Flock ALPR Data with the following entities in 2024/2025:

2024 Shared Agencies	2025 Shared Agencies
Alameda (City) Police Department	Fremont CA PD
Alameda County Sheriff's Office	Santa Clara CA PD
Alameda County Sheriff's Office-Dublin Police	Mountain View CA PD (Santa Clara County)
Burlingame Police Department	Pleasanton CA PD
CA State Parks	Hillsborough CA PD
Cal Fire - Law Enforcement	California State Parks
California Highway Patrol	Brisbane CA PD
Campbell PD	San Mateo County CA SO
Colma Police Department	San Joaquin County CA SO
Concord (CA) PD	Daly City CA PD
Daly City Police Department	Redwood City CA PD
Danville PD	Contra Costa County CA SO
Dixon Police Department	Concord CA PD
East Bay Regional Park District Police	Newark CA PD
East Palo Alto Police Department	Cal Fire
El Cerrito PD	Hayward CA PD
Emeryville Police Department	Piedmont CA PD
Fairfield California Police Department	Solano County CA SO
Fremont Police Department	El Cerrito CA PD
Hayward Police Department	Vallejo CA PD
Livermore Police Department	Burlingame CA PD
Los Altos PD	Danville CA PD
Marin County Sheriff's Office	Colma CA PD
Mountain View Police Department	Brentwood CA PD
Napa County Sheriff's Office	San Francisco CA PD
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC)	Novato CA PD
Newark (CA) Police Department	East Palo Alto CA PD
Novato PD	Emeryville CA PD
Piedmont Police Department	Palo Alto CA PD
Pleasant Hill Police Department	Livermore CA PD
Pleasanton Police Department	Alameda County CA SO
Redwood City PD	East Bay Parks CA PD
Richmond (Calif) Police Department	Campbell CA PD
Sacramento County Sheriff's Office	Sonoma County CA SO
San Bruno Police Department	Milpitas CA PD
San Francisco Police Department	San Jose CA PD
San Leandro Police Department	California Highway Patrol
San Mateo County Sheriff's Office	University of California, Berkeley
	Union City CA PD
	Pleasant Hill CA PD
	San Leandro CA PD
	West Sacramento CA PD
	Santa Rosa CA PD
	San Bruno CA PD
	Sausalito CA PD
	San Mateo CA PD
	Fairfield CA PD
	San Ramon CA PD

San Mateo Police Dept  
San Ramon Police Dept.  
Santa Barbara Sheriff's Office  
Santa Clara County Sheriff's  
Office  
Santa Clara Police Department  
SF District Attorney's Office  
Solano County Sheriff's Office  
Sunnyvale Department of Public  
Safety  
Union City PD  
Vacaville Police Department  
Vallejo Police Department  
Watsonville Police Department

Dublin CA PD (ACSO)  
Berkeley CA PD  
Pacifica CA PD  
Richmond CA PD  
Belmont CA PD  
San Francisco District Attorney  
CA  
Sacramento CA DA  
Petaluma CA PD  
Capitola CA PD  
Rohnert Park Department of  
Public Safety (CA)  
Sacramento CA PD  
Marin County CA SO  
Moraga CA PD  
Central Marin CA PD  
Town of Los Gatos CA  
Solano County DA CA  
Sunnyvale CA PD  
Los Altos CA PD  
Alameda CA PD  
Walnut Creek CA PD

To obtain access to our Flock database, each organization had to fill out a permission form and agree to the following questions:


- Do you agree to the following: I confirm, on behalf of my agency or department, in compliance with state law, OPDs ALPR data SHALL NOT be used or shared with other agencies for the purpose of pursuing criminal charges or civil enforcement against individuals for obtaining, providing, or supporting reproductive or gender affirming health care services, to ensure that the medical and legal rights of residents of and visitors to Oakland, a Sanctuary City, remain intact.
- Do you agree to the following? I confirm, on behalf of my agency or department, that anytime we access OPDs ALPR data, there will be a need to know and right to know.
- Do you agree to the following? I confirm, on behalf of my agency or department, that anytime we access OPDs ALPR data, we will document the following: PC/VC related to the incident, and the department incident or administrative investigation number.

After agreeing to those three questions, the requesting agency was granted access, with approval being logged in a spreadsheet. This information is in [Attachment A – PAC 2025 Annual Report Data](#) on the tab called “Third Party Data Sharing”. Any time our information is accessed, a log is created and kept in the Flock system. The second question in the permission form states that agencies will only request to search against our database if they have the need to know and right to know, therefore, any searches the agency completes after signing the permission form meets the obligations required with DGO I-12.

Currently, in April 2026, the OPD created a new sharing agreement which has been reviewed and approved by the City Attorney’s Office, which provides further restrictions in accordance with recommendations from council codified under CMS 91008. (Attachment C). OPD is currently in the process of distributing this form to agencies which have previously been granted access to OPD data.

**Figure C** shows the number of searches that have been done against our data, month over month, in 2024 vs. 2025. Again, Flock came online in July 2024, and no external searches were conducted prior to that time. All the entities listed previously can execute searches against our data. If there is a match in our system, they will be presented with a screenshot which shows the following information:

Figure C



- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

Working in conjunction with the OPD, Flock analyzed heat maps as it relates to violent crime and property crime (stolen vehicles, burglaries, and grand theft) and identified the main egress and ingress locations to these hot spots. As a result, 290 locations were selected for camera placement. These cameras are mounted on pre-existing city infrastructure, such as light poles or traffic light poles, or they can be mounted utilizing a pole provided by Flock. These cameras are currently the only source of data, that are OPD assigned, feeding into the Flock system.:

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically by each police area in the relevant year:

A total of 290 ALPR cameras were funded and deployed throughout the City of Oakland. There are six geographical policing areas that OPD identifies: Area 1 – Area 6.<sup>1</sup>

Based on crime data and identifying the main egress and ingress locations to these hot spots, the 290 cameras were deployed within the respective six areas as follows:

- Area 1: 44
- Area 2: 57
- Area 3: 23

<sup>1</sup> [City of Oakland | Oakland Police Areas](#)

- Area 4: 55
- Area 5: 51
- Area 6: 60

E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

The Oakland Police Department requests a waiver of this requirement, as Flock Cameras cannot determine the race of an individual, since the primary focus is on capturing the vehicle license plate. In addition, OPD was made aware of the below Opposing and Supporting comments as it relates to the technology. The below chart shows the categories of such comments.

<b><u>Comments Opposing</u></b>	<b><u>Comments Supporting</u></b>
<p>Risk to vulnerable communities &amp; concerns for Sanctuary Law violations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fear Flock ALPR data will be used by ICE or other agencies to target immigrants, undermining Oakland's Sanctuary policies and increasing community fear.</li> </ul>	<p>Crime deterrence and reduction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Belief that Flock cameras are contributing to significant drops in robberies and helping deter repeat offenders.</li> </ul>
<p>Lack of safeguards, oversight, and accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concerns about insufficient data protections, weak enforcement mechanisms, lack of civilian oversight, and inadequate penalties for vendor violations.</li> </ul>	<p>Improved investigative capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cameras provide valuable leads for solving crimes, recovering stolen vehicles, and interrupting crime patterns—especially important given staffing shortages.</li> </ul>
<p>Data sharing &amp; privacy concerns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Worry that collected data could be accessed by non-Californian state entities</li> </ul>	<p>Privacy-conscious design</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• System does not use facial recognition or collect demographic data, with policies in place to limit misuse and regulate data sharing.</li> </ul>

<p>Comparison to alternative approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Citing Richmond’s approach as a better model.</li> </ul>	<p>Legal safeguards in place</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State law restricts sharing ALPR data with federal agencies, intended to prevent use for immigration enforcement.</li> </ul>
	<p>No strong alternative tools</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concern that without Flock OPD would have a weakened ability to maintain public safety due to limited staffing and resources.</li> </ul>

F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

The Oakland Police Department is not aware of any violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy.

Per DGO I-12, “the records of database investigatory queries, third party data sharing, and hot list entries shall be incorporated into the annual report...”.

In addition, “ALPR system audits shall be conducted annually to ensure proper system functionality and that designated personnel are using the system according to policy rules via sample audits and reviews of training records”.

To satisfy the first requirement, please see [Attachment A – PAC 2025 Annual Report Data](#) . In this spreadsheet, there are several tabs that house the specific data being requested. The tab labeled Third Party Data Sharing lists all the organizations which have access to search against OPDs database of images in Flock. The tab labeled Hot List Entries has the hot lists which OPD created. The internal organization records were split into two tabs, Database Queries Jan-May and Jun-Dec, which houses all investigative queries performed in 2025.

The audit information begins on the tab labeled Database Queries Audit. This audit was done by doing a randomized audit of 500 records. Originally, 500 records were selected, four of these returned as “DAYTIME SEARCH FOR BEST RESULTS” which is a system-generated phrase by Flock, when a user runs a normal plate search and then clicks “best daytime image”. The platform automatically runs a secondary search to pull the clearest daytime image. The automatic follow-up query is what gets logged. These entries do not represent separate, independent searches. The original search data is maintained in the audit for full compliance. For that reason, these searches were omitted from the statistics. OPD then looked at the “reason” provided for the search. Per DGO I-12, there are several elements that are required to perform a database investigative search: the date and time the information is accessed, the license plate number or other data elements used to query the system, the username of the person who accesses the information, and the purpose for accessing the information.

This information is labeled as the Database Queries Audit Tab in the spreadsheet. The fields labeled as RD/LP Included and Type of Crime Included were the basis of the audit. Since the Flock system logs of all the other information by default when a user initiates a database investigative query, the users are left to enter their reasons manually.

To meet the requirements defined in DGO I-12, OPD has asked staff to standardize their reason to include the report number or incident number, which can start with RD (which stands for Records Division) or LOP (which designates the CAD incident as bellowing to Law – Oakland Police). In addition, we ask that users put in the crime associated with the search, preferably in the form of the penal code or vehicle code, but a written crime reason is also acceptable. In December 2024 Flock updated the search format to a dropdown format which removed the ability to enter Freeform text for offense type. OPD now has a specific list of search reasons which must be selected by the user prior to conducting a query within the system. A second box requires the user to enter an associated LOP or RD number. The third box is another drop down box which has a list of Penal Code, California Vehicle Code or Oakland Municipal Codes related to the search reason first selected. Each of these boxes must be filled out prior to conducting a search against the system.

The full list of currently allowable search reasons is contained in attachment D.

Based on this criteria, 496 records were evaluated. Below are the results of the audit, which show that OPD had a report or incident number included in 98% of the audited files and had the crime included in 100% of the audited files.

Total RD/LP "Yes"	488
Total RD/LP "No"	8
Total Type of Crime "Yes"	496
Total Type of Crime "No"	0
RD/LP included - Audit Pass Rate	98%
Crime Included - Audit Pass Rate	100%

OPD has continued to conduct routine audits of searches conducted by OPD personnel to ensure compliance with DGO I-12. Emails are sent out periodically to update individuals of policy requirements.

DGO I-12 also calls for a review of training records to ensure that only authorized users are utilizing the ALPR system. Please refer to the tab labeled Training Roster to see a list of all individuals at OPD who have been trained on the policy and use of the Flock ALPR system. There are approximately 353 people who have been trained as of the writing of this report. A random selection of 25 users was selected from those who were audited in the Database Queries Audit. Of the 25 selected users, all 25 were found to have completed training.

As it relates to user/access management, OPD does not manually disable users who separate from the department, as Flock utilizes single sign on with the City of Oakland’s Microsoft Office 365 application. When a member or employee separates from the department, the Information Technology Department (ITD) is responsible for disabling the Microsoft Office 365 account, which will, in turn, disable the Flock account.

G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:


The Oakland Police Department confirmed via the Flock Security Portal Statement of Compliance which confirmed that Flock did not suffer any security breaches as it relates to their infrastructure.

H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

OPD continues to track the outcomes of utilizing ALPR as an investigative tool. All the information that follows can be found on the tabs labeled Flock Outcomes (Enforcement) and Flock Outcomes Metrics in the [PAC 2025 Annual Report Data spreadsheet](#).


As shown in **Figure E** below, OPD logged a total of 425 vs 240 (2024) success stories in Flock from January 2025 through December 2025. Based on these actions, OPD was able to generate 425 vs.112 (2024) leads, 99 vs 55 (2024) were cleared by arrests,143 vs 34 (2024) were cleared by other means such as vehicle recovery, 37 vs 31 (2024) are in-progress investigations, and 5 vs 8 (2024) warrants were issued.

*Figure E*



Summarization of all outcomes shows that OPD made 162 vs 98 (2024) arrests, recovered 174 vs 32 (2024) vehicles, and recovered 51 vs 29 (2024) guns, as seen in **Figure F** below:

*Figure F*



OPD, through a manual review of the data, was able to determine the offense linked to each of these outcomes as listed below in **Table A**. Areas of note include robbery and robbery +, which had a combined 35 arrests, 11 vehicles recovered and 5 firearms recovered. Flock also assisted in the arrest of 22 carjacking suspects, 11 human trafficking suspects and 16 suspects related to firearms offenses.

OPD has quickly identified vehicle(s) of interest related to crimes and quickly identified vehicle(s) utilized in a series of crimes. These still images are sent via email to officers and hot listed and officers have had quickly solved cases.

Offense	Arrests	Vehicles Recovered	Guns Recovered
Aggravated Assault	12	1	4
Burglary	7	0	0
Carjacking	22	8	4
Felony Evading	12	0	0
Motor Vehicle Theft	4	0	0
Murder/Manslaughter	19	0	16
Human Trafficking	11	0	4
Rape	4	0	0
Robbery	20	6	4
Robbery +	15	5	1
Weapons Possession	16	1	12
Other	20	4	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>50</b>

Finally, here are three example cases that demonstrate the usefulness of Flock cameras to OPD:

- RD# 25-048437 Flock technology was used to identify an armed robbery suspect vehicle. Vehicle had switched plate at the time. Flock technology was used to successfully identify

true identity of vehicle based on previous hits, leading to the direct identification of one of the armed robbery suspects and a warrant of arrest.

- RD # 25-009125 OPD Air Support Unit officers were on a routine patrol flight in OPD Helicopter "Argus" when they received a flock alert for a robbery vehicle through the flock mobile app. Air Support Unit officers were able to spot the vehicle travelling E/B along International Blvd which coincided with the alerts and coordinated with ground units for a takedown. The vehicle fled and with the assistance of ACSO Air, ACSO ground units, and ACCRAT, 3 subjects were detained in the city of Hayward with the driver being taken into custody. OPD units then responded to Hayward to take over the investigation. Driver had an outstanding warrant for 211.
- Throughout 2025 over 140 sideshow related vehicles were identified and located with the assistance of Flock Technology. Seizure warrants were authored for these vehicles which resulted in a court ordered tow along with a 30 day hold for each vehicle.

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

OPD received sixteen (16) Public Records Requests (PRRs) in 2025 that were related to ALPR technology, eleven are responded to and five await completion of our response. The requests are summarized below:

- 25-6339 – which asked for network and organizational audits (complete)
- 25-8866 – Requesting contracts, policies, documents, emails related to acquisition and implementation of Flock cameras along with network and organization audits (Fulfillment pending).
- 25-9053 – which asked for contract data (complete)
- 25-9414 – which asked for data related to hotlists maintained within Flock (complete)
- 25-9415 – which asked for network and organizational audits as well as network share agreements (Fulfillment pending).
- 25-9970 – which requested all camera locations (complete).
- 25-10951 – which requested network and organizational audits (Fulfillment pending)
- 25-11188 – which asked for data related to success stories and incidents which utilized Flock cameras (Fulfillment pending).
- 25-11890 – which asked for images and data from a specific timeframe (advised no responsive records).
- 25-11903 – which asked for information regarding Flock Camera at Broadmoor and San Leandro (complete)
- 25-12073 – which asked for images from search data (advised no responsive records).
- 25-12152 – which asked for data related to a stolen vehicle (advised unable to fulfill request).
- 25-12208 – which asked for information regarding camera functionality (advised no responsive records).
- 25-12599 – which asked for information regarding all OPD users who have had Flock access (complete).

- 25-12811 - which asked for network and organizational audits (Fulfillment pending)
- 25-12820 – which asked for data related to Flock usage and encampments (advised no responsive records).

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

*On October 13, 2023, Oakland City Council adopted Resolution 89952 approving OPD and authorizing the City Administrator to enter into a \$1,200,000 in state loan funding to purchase ALPR Technology and Services. There was a three-year agreement to Flock Safety at a cost of \$1,077,500 for the first year, \$900,000 for year two and year three for a total amount not to exceed \$2,877,500.*

The estimated cost for Flock for the first year is approximately \$1,200,000, due to the way that cameras were prorated based on their use in the first contract year. OPD anticipates that the next year of Flock service will cost approximately \$900,000 and the third will be \$900,000 and this will come out of the Oakland Police Department's budget. Funds will be allocated from the General-Purpose Fund (1010), Information Technology Unit Org. (106410), Contract Services Account (54919), Administrative Project (1000008), Agency-wide Administrative Program (PS01).

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

OPD has drafted an amended Use Policy for ALPR (attachment B). The OPD Use Policy is documented under Departmental General Order (DGO) I-12. I-12 has been amended to expand the allowable uses to better align with the council's directive towards I-32.1 which was documented in Oakland City Council Resolution 91008 C.M.S.

The primary changes to DGO I-12 include:

- 1) A comprehensive list of allowable search reasons within the ALPR system to include illegal dumping.
- 2) Specific prohibitions of the use of OPD ALPR data for gender affirming, reproductive health, and immigration related activities.
- 3) Implementation of a two-key approval process for new sharing agreements with outside agencies to allow access to OPD ALPR Data.
- 4) Amended Sharing Agreement Form, which affirms the above as well as requires outside agencies to affirm that they will comply with OPD Policy for searches as well as SB 34 and SB 54. This document has been produced in conjunction with the City Attorney's Office.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

For any questions with this report, please contact, Lt Omar Daza-Quiroz, at [odaza-quiroz@oaklandca.gov](mailto:odaza-quiroz@oaklandca.gov), or Lt. Gabriel Urquiza at [GUrquiza-Leibin@oaklandca.gov](mailto:GUrquiza-Leibin@oaklandca.gov)

Respectfully submitted,

James P. Beere, Interim Chief of Police  
OPD, Office of the Chief of Police

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**Attachments (4):**

- A: 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Data Sharing (link)
- B: Update DGO I-12
- C: Sharing Agreement
- D: Allowable search reasons



## DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER

### I-12: AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS

Effective Date: 2 April 2026

Coordinator: Information Technology Unit

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This policy provides guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of ALPR technology while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

#### Definitions

- (a) **Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR):** A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images of vehicle license plates to lists of known information of interest.
- (b) **Hot List:** A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to the Stolen Vehicle System (SVS), NCIC, and local BOLO alerts.
- (c) **Hit:** Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person or domestic violence protective order.

#### A. **Description of the Technology:** *Information describing the surveillance technology and how it works.*

OPD uses Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images. There are two components to the ALPR system:

1. Automated License Plate Readers: Device components include cameras which can be attached to vehicles or fixed objects and a vehicle-based computer that processes the photographs and compares the data against California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) hot lists. Data are transmitted for comparison (the hot lists are downloaded to the vehicle at the start of the patrol shift and then compared from that list). Authorized/designated personnel can also manually enter license plates to internal OPD generated hot lists only accessible to personnel authorized/designated to access the OPD ALPR system.
2. ALPR Database: A central repository stores data collected and transmitted by the Automated License Plate Readers.

## **B. Purpose of the Technology**

ALPR technology works by automatically and indiscriminately scanning all license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible. ALPR reads these license plates, compares the license plate characters against Hot Lists, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location where the photograph was taken. This process allows for two functions by ALPR:

1. Immediate (real time) comparison of the license plate characters against Hot Lists listing vehicles that are stolen or sought in connection with a crime and/or with OPD-generated internal lists.
2. Storage of the license plate characters – along with the date, time, and location where the photography was taken – in a database that is accessible to enforcement agencies with authorized access (as defined in “Authorized Use” below) for investigative query purposes.

## **C. Authorized Uses:** *The specific uses that are authorized, and the rules and processes required prior to such use.*

### **1. Authorized Users**

Personnel authorized/designated to use ALPR equipment or access information collected through the use of such equipment shall be specifically trained in such technology. Sworn personnel, Police Service Technicians (PST), or other authorized/designated Department personnel may use the technology. Authorized users other than sworn personnel or PSTs must be designated by the Chief of Police or designee.

### **2. Authorized Use**

(A) **Real-Time Identification:** The sworn personnel/technician shall verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before possibly taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

Once an alert is received, the operator shall confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle.

Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been fully validated, by visually verifying that the license plate characters on the vehicle match those in the database, and that the make, model, color and all other known identifying characteristics likewise match.

(1) **Hot Lists.** The Department shall only use the following hot lists: Stolen Vehicle System (“SVS”), National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) lists, CA DOJ lists, Amber and Silver alerts, and custom BOLO lists pertaining solely to missing or at-risk persons, witness

locates, burglaries, grand theft, and violent crime investigation. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's ALPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's ALPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the ALPR system's read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

- (2) Department members will document all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action on a computer generated spreadsheet that shall include at minimum a) the Department member's name that responded to the alert, b) the justification for responding to the alert, c) the related case number, d) the disposition code, e) time and date of the response, and f) and any known next steps or follow up (e.g. forwarding case to District Attorney, alerting owner to recovered stolen vehicle).

(B) **Database Investigative Queries:** Historical searches of scanned plates are permissible for crimes/incidents including illegal dumping, theft, vehicle theft, human trafficking, reckless driving, sideshow/takeovers, felony evasion, burglaries, robberies, firearms offenses, shootings, and homicides. Accessing the data shall be based on a standard of Reasonable Suspicion or greater. See attachment A for full list of allowable search reasons.

For each query, the Department shall record (1) the date and time the information is accessed, (2) the license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR system, (3) the username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated, and (4) the purpose for accessing the information. These records shall be attached to the annual report required by O.M.C. 9.64 et seq.

1. General Hot Lists (such as SVS and NCIC) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.
2. All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. All entries shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers' attention to specific vehicles of interest that might have been associated with criminal

activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:

- Entering Department member's name.
- Related case number.
- Justification for entering the plate and/or other identifying information onto the Hot List.
- Date and time of entry.

### 3. Restrictions on Use

**Impermissible Uses.** All ALPR recordings collected from ALPR cameras installed on Oakland property are the property of the Oakland Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

(1) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, it is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment). OPD shall make reasonable efforts to restrict the usage of the ALPR technology to the public right of way and other public property in alignment with this restriction.

(2) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

(3) Use Based on a Protected Characteristic: It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

(4) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

(5) First Amendment Rights: It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(6) Medical Rights: No data from ALPR shall be used or shared with other agencies for the purpose of pursuing criminal charges or civil enforcement against individuals for obtaining, providing, or

supporting reproductive health care services, or gender affirming care in California to ensure that medical rights of residents of and visitors to Oakland, a Sanctuary City, remain intact.

(7) Immigration: No data from ALPR shall be used or shared with local or state agencies for the purpose of federal immigration enforcement.

Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code §798.90.51.; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

a. No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

b. No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized/designated to do so pursuant to Section E “Data Access” below.

c. Accessing data collected by ALPR requires a right to know and a need to know. A right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a state or federal statute, applicable case law, or a court order. A need to know is a compelling reason to request information such as involvement in an active investigation.

**D. Data Collection:** *The information that can be collected by the surveillance technology. Where applicable, list any data sources the technology will rely upon, including “open source” data.*

ALPR technology works by automatically scanning license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible. ALPR reads these license plates, compares the license plate characters (as well as vehicle attributes such as vehicle color or make and model with some ALPR systems) against specific databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location where the photograph was taken, in a database.

**E. Data Access:** *The category of individuals who can access or use the collected information, and the rules and processes required prior to access or use of the information.*

Department sworn personnel, police service technicians, or other authorized/designated Department personnel may use the technology. Authorized/designated users other than sworn personnel or PSTs must be designated by the Chief of Police or designee.

Data may not be shared with out of state or federal agencies, per California law.

The Oakland Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data

gathered by the city or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CPB).

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Some information may not be disclosable to the general public. Investigatory records are not generally disclosable in response to a public records request. Non-investigatory records shall be disclosed in response to a public records request.

**F. Data Protection:** *The safeguards that protect information from unauthorized access, including encryption and access control mechanisms.*

All data shall be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. OPD shall observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

1. All ALPR server data shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by username, license number or other data elements used in the search, name, date, time and purpose. (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
2. Data will be transferred from ALPRs to the designated storage per the ALPR technology data transfer protocol.

**G. Data Retention:** *The time period, if any, for which information collected by the surveillance technology will be routinely retained, the reason such retention period is appropriate to further the purpose(s), the process by which the information is regularly deleted after that period lapses, and the specific conditions that must be met to retain information beyond that period.*

All ALPR data uploaded to the server shall be purged from the server at the point of 30 days from initial upload. ALPR information may be retained outside this retention limit solely for the following purposes:

1. Active Criminal Investigations
2. Missing or at-risk Persons Investigations
3. Investigations from other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies where there is a legal obligation to retain information.

**H. Public Access:** *how collected information can be accessed or used by members of the public, including criminal defendants.*

Requests for ALPR information by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed in accordance with Civil Code §

1798.90.55, Government Code § 7920.000 et seq., this policy, and applicable case law and court orders.

**I. Third Party Data Sharing:** *If and how other City departments, bureaus, divisions, or non-City entities can access or use the information, including any required justification or legal standard necessary to do so and any obligations imposed on the recipient of the information.*

ALPR server data may be shared only as otherwise permitted by law and this policy. All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this Department.

OPD has executed an MOU that grants CHP access to OPDs ALPR data for the duration of the MOU.

OPD personnel may share ALPR server data when there is a legal obligation to do so, such as a subpoena, court order or warrant to share such information, such as the following:

- a District Attorney's Office for use as evidence to aid in prosecution, in accordance with laws governing evidence;
- a Public Defender's Office or criminal defense attorney via the District Attorney's Office in accordance with applicable California criminal discovery laws;
- California law enforcement agencies as part of a formal criminal or administrative investigation;
- a party to civil litigation, or other third parties, in response to a valid court order only.
- **Oakland Public Works (OPW) and/or the City Attorney's Office** for the purpose of evaluating and supporting the enforcement of the City's **administrative and civil penalties related to illegal dumping**.
- The Oakland Police Department or the City of Oakland shall solicit written documentation from the requesting agency confirming that the requested data from ALPR is not intended to be used for the prohibited purposes set forth herein. Such information shall be provided to all OPD sworn personnel responsible for providing the requested data.

When there is no legal obligation to provide the requested data, requests to access the ALPR server data from other California law enforcement agencies shall be made in writing and may only be approved by the BOS Deputy Director/Chief or designee per the 3-step protocol below. These requests shall be maintained in a secure folder so that information about these requests can be shared in required annual reports with the PAC. Server access shall be restricted only to authorized/designated OPD personnel who will extract the

required information and forward it to the requester, unless an approved sharing agreement allows continual access. (See attachment B for current sharing agreement)

1. The requesting party shall have a right to know, and a need to know. A right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a court order, statutory law, case law, or sworn officer status. A need to know is a compelling reason to request information such as direct involvement in an investigation.
2. The Department shall record the requesting party's name and document the right and need to know the requested information.
3. The Department shall record whether the request was honored or denied, the reason for such action, and the name of the Department officer that processed the request.

Two-Key Approval System-barring exigent circumstances, no sharing relationship, data-access grant, or modification of sharing permissions may occur unless approved through a two-key system consisting of:

- a) The Chief Privacy Officer in the City Administrator's Office; and
- b) Oakland Police Department's Information Technology Director;
- c) In the event of an exigent circumstance the City Administrator's Chief Privacy Officer will be informed 72 hours after the exigency ends, and should be reported out to the Privacy Commission at the next meeting.

**J. Training:** *The training required for any individual authorized to use the surveillance technology or to access information collected by the surveillance technology.*

The Training Section shall ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized/designated to use or access the ALPR system and shall maintain a record of all completed trainings. (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code §1798.90.53).

Training requirements for employees shall include the following:

- Applicable federal and state law
- Applicable policy
- Functionality of equipment
- Accessing data
- Safeguarding password information and data

- Sharing of data
- Reporting breaches
- Implementing post-breach procedures

**K. *Auditing and Oversight:*** *The mechanisms to ensure that the Surveillance Use Policy is followed, including internal personnel assigned to ensure compliance with the policy, internal record keeping of the use of the technology or access to information collected by the technology, technical measures to monitor for misuse, any independent person or entity with oversight authority, and the legally enforceable sanctions for violations of the policy.*

Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited. It is the responsibility of the Department under this policy to actively pursue software and hardware upgrades that are needed to maintain full compliance with Section K of the use policy.

The records of Database Investigatory Queries, Third Party Data Sharing, and Hot List entries shall be incorporated into the annual report required by O.M.C. 9.64 et seq.

ALPR system audits shall be conducted annually to ensure proper system functionality and that designated personnel are using the system according to policy rules via sample audits, and reviews of training records. The size of these audits shall be large enough to provide a statistically significant representation of the data collected.

Audits shall also be conducted annually of searches conducted by outside agency against OPD ALPR data. The size of these audits shall be large enough to provide a stat.

**L. *Maintenance:*** *The mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the security and integrity of the surveillance technology and collected information will be maintained.*

- 1. ALPR Administration:** All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the BOS. The BOS may contract with an ALPR service provider for installation and maintenance assistance.
- 2. ALPR Administrator:** The BOS Deputy Director/Chief shall be the administrator of the ALPR program, and shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. The BOS Deputy Director/Chief is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection, and retention of ALPR data.
- 3. ALPR Coordinator:** The title of the official custodian of the ALPR system

is the ALPR Coordinator.

4. **Monitoring and Reporting:** The Oakland Police Department will ensure that the system is remains functional according to its intended use and monitor its use of ALPR technology to ensure the proper functionality of the system as defined in the policy guidelines of this document, including required audits, training, and data access records.
5. The ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police, Privacy Advisory Commission, and Public Safety Committee with an annual report pursuant to OMC 9.64 (Oakland Surveillance Technology Ordinance).

By Order of,

James P. Beere  
Interim Chief of Police

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment A

- Animal Offenses (cruelty/neglect)
- Arson
- Assault/Battery Offenses
- Assault/Battery Offenses (Domestic)
- Burglary/Breaking & Entering
- Child Abuse/Neglect
- Criminal Motor Vehicle Offense (incl. Road Rage/Reckless)
- Destruction/Damage/Vandalism of Property
- Driving Under the Influence (DUI/DWI/OWI/OVI)
- Drugs/Narcotics
- Hit and Run/Car Accident
- Homicide/Death Investigation
- Human Trafficking
- Illegal Dumping/Littering
- Indecent Exposure/Lewd
- Kidnapping/Abduction
- Larceny/Theft Offenses
- Material Witness
- Missing/Endangered Person/Runaway
- Motor Vehicle Theft/Stolen
- Obstructing the Police (Fleeing/Eluding)
- Pornography/Obscene Material
- Property Recovery (Civil Enforcement)
- Prostitution
- Robbery
- Sex Offenses
- Stalking
- Stolen Property Offenses
- Terrorism/Terroristic Threats
- Threats/Harassment
- Wanted Person (Arrest Warrant/Fugitive)
- Weapons Offense (Guns/Shots Fired)
- Welfare Check

1. Name of the law enforcement organization requesting access.
2. Contact information of the person requesting access on behalf of the named organization (Please include name, email, address, phone number, and, if applicable, serial number).
3. Contact information for person in charge of ALPR data at the named organization if different from above (Please include, name, email address, phone number, and, if applicable, serial number).
4. I confirm on behalf of my organization, that the organization is a “public agency” within the definition of Cal. Civil Code, §1798.90.5(f).
5. I confirm, on behalf of my organization, that my organization will only access OPD’s ALPR data when it has a right to know and a need to know ALPR information. The right to know is the legal authority.
6. I confirm, on behalf of my organization, that any time we access OPD’s ALPR data, we will document the applicable statutory violation (e.g., Penal Code or Vehicle Code section), and my organization’s
7. I confirm, on behalf of my organization, that any access by our organization to OPD’s ALPR data will comply with authorized uses as outlined in OPD DGO I-12
8. I confirm, on behalf of my agency or department, that any access by our organization to OPD’s ALPR data will be in compliance with state law including SB 34 (codified in Cal. Civil Code, § 1798.90.5 e
9. I confirm, on behalf of my organization, that noncompliance with state law OPD’s ALPR data shall not and will not be used or shared with other agencies for the purpose of pursuing criminal charges or c
10. I confirm, on behalf of my organization, that OPD's ALPR data shall not and will not be used or shared with other agencies for the purpose of federal immigration enforcement.

### **Approved offense types in Flock**

- Animal Offenses (cruelty/neglect)
- Arson
- Assault/Battery Offenses
- Assault/Battery Offenses (Domestic)
- Burglary/Breaking & Entering
- Child Abuse/Neglect
- Criminal Motor Vehicle Offense (incl. Road Rage/Reckless)
- Destruction/Damage/Vandalism of Property
- Driving Under the Influence (DUI/DWI/OWI/OVI)
- Drugs/Narcotics
- Hit and Run/Car Accident
- Homicide/Death Investigation
- Human Trafficking
- Illegal Dumping/Littering
- Indecent Exposure/Lewd
- Kidnapping/Abduction
- Larceny/Theft Offenses
- Material Witness
- Missing/Endangered Person/Runaway
- Motor Vehicle Theft/Stolen
- Obstructing the Police (Fleeing/Eluding)
- Pornography/Obscene Material
- Property Recovery (Civil Enforcement)
- Prostitution
- Robbery

- Sex Offenses
- Stalking
- Stolen Property Offenses
- Terrorism/Terroristic Threats
- Threats/Harassment
- Wanted Person (Arrest Warrant/Fugitive)
- Weapons Offense (Guns/Shots Fired)
- Welfare Check