

CITY OF OAKLAND
AGENDA REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK
2007 APR 12 PM 7:25

To: Office of the City Administrator
Attn: Deborah Edgerly
From: Police Department
Date: April 24, 2007

Re: A Report from the Chief of Police on The Oakland Police Department Assessment Project, Conducted by Harnett Associates, on Organizational and Operational Recommendations to Improve the Department's Effectiveness in Reducing Crime in the City

SUMMARY

Prior to leaving office, former Mayor Jerry Brown hired Harnett Associates to assess barriers to effective crime fighting in Oakland. The Harnett team included experienced law enforcement professionals who contributed to the turnaround of the New York Police Department in 1994, and 1995. Harnett Associates spent eight days assessing police operations in Oakland, including the reporting structure and lines of authority and responsibility; however, a full analysis of all Departmental operations and functions was not conducted.

The report, entitled *Crime Fighting in Oakland - An Assessment of the Oakland Police Department* ("Harnett Report"), provides specific recommendations for strengthening the Department's crime fighting efficiency and community focus. It should be stated that the *Harnett Report* is not a plan but a set of guidelines for the Oakland Police department ("OPD") to consider in constructing a geographic, neighborhood-based policing plan, a heightened accountability structure, and effective utilization of investigative resources.

FISCAL IMPACT

Fiscal impacts related to organizational changes within the OPD have not been identified. The reorganization steps currently being planned and/or implemented are structured to remain within the Department's current appropriations.

BACKGROUND

In 1996, the OPD implemented a Patrol 35 Area-based Command Plan (geographic accountability). To strengthen the Police Department's efforts toward community policing, field deployment and command structure were established in three distinct areas. This move represented a significant shift of field resources and command responsibilities from a citywide temporal (watch-based) focus to a 24-hour, seven days per week geographic focus. Each of the three areas was commanded by a Captain of Police who possessed the primary authority and responsibility of directing police services. Particular emphasis was placed on crime control, officer conduct, and controlling discretionary costs. Area commanders met monthly with the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of Police to discuss, review, and resolve issues affecting their

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command. Although the concept was well conceived, the infrastructure was not in place to ensure that the objectives of an Area Command system were accomplished.

During the 1996 reorganization of OPD to an Area Command structure, then Police Chief Joseph Samuels wrote:

“Though strenuous effort was made to observe and adhere to tested principles of organization, the reality is that most problems or opportunities facing police departments cannot be resolved or achieved by simply reorganizing. Reorganization will not overcome weaknesses in the motivation or capabilities of personnel, eliminate inertia, or generate the momentum or enthusiasm for effective direction and positive changes. Observing basic organizational principles will, however, produce an organizational structure that will promote organizational effectiveness when capable personnel, motivation and other essential factors are present. Organization structures should not be viewed as permanent or fixed-but dynamic and fluid. As changes occur in the police environment - internal and external - so, too, will the organization structure. Accordingly, this reorganization should be viewed as a phase in the Department's evolution.”

The Patrol 35 Area Command plan encountered several difficulties (e.g., understaffed Patrol Division, a very high volume of calls for service that exceed the capacity of personnel authorized to respond, insufficient time for sworn staff to engage in meaningful problem solving). Moreover, as noted in the *Harnett Report*, the watch (temporal) command system created significant resource conflicts and unity of command issues.

KEY ISSUES AND IMPACTS

The *Harnett Report* is divided into five major sections: A “Summary of Findings and Issues” section, which provided a brief historical overview of the Department; the “A Neighborhood Policing Plan Template” section, detailing why the Department should return to a geographic-based policing plan; an “Establishing an Accountability Forum” section, discussing the need for major revisions to the Department’s CrimeStop meetings to bring them closer to the CompStat model of command accountability for addressing emerging crime patterns; a section on “Investigations and Other Crime-Fighting Issues”, which notes a need to increase staff levels in the Criminal Investigation Division (especially Homicide, Robbery, and Narcotics) and the Criminalistics Division; and concluding with an “Organizational Change Template” section, offering a planning progression to keep Police Department personnel, elected officials, and community members informed and engaged in the reorganization process. For easy cross-reference, this report is similarly sectioned.


Summary of Findings and Issues

In addition to its other findings, the *Harnett Report* identified significant staffing shortages in the Patrol Division, Criminal Investigation Division, and Crime Analysis Unit, and articulates that sufficient staffing is necessary to fully implement the *Harnett Report's* recommendations. According to the *Harnett Report* (page 7):

“Although the structural and operational issues described above are critical to improving the crime-fighting performance of the Oakland Police Department, there are other **significant impediments undercutting performance. The first and most obvious is staffing.** (emphasis added) By the standards of many other American police departments, Oakland, with an authorized strength of 802 (including Measure Y officers who have yet to be hired) is understaffed to serve a population of more than 400,000, fielding fewer than 20 officers per 10,000 residents. In contrast, New York City fields more than 40 officers per 10,000 residents, and Washington D.C. fields about 60. Yet, even within the authorization, Oakland is experiencing shortages. A recent Bureau of Field Operations roster shows 11 police officer vacancies on First Watch, 14 on Second Watch, and 13 on Third Watch. The Department is staffing 115 beats on overtime each week. The Criminal Investigation Division lost 13 personnel in the past two years without any replacements. The Department has only 10 homicide investigators and only seven robbery investigators, or less than one robbery investigator for every 500 robberies reported in 2006.”

Additionally, according to an OPD overtime assessment report (April 17, 2005) citing 2003 data, OPD has far fewer officers to respond to violent crime than other large agencies in California. Oakland handles 7.6 violent crimes per officer compared with 2.5 in San Jose, 3.7 in Long Beach, or 4.4 in Sacramento). Oakland officers shoulder an onerous crime fighting burden.

Violent crimes per FTE



The OPD, with outstanding assistance from the Finance and Management Agency’s Office of Personnel Resource Management, has been working diligently to recruit, test, train, and hire the sworn personnel needed to attain authorized strength. During calendar year 2006, the City graduated 43 Police Officer Trainees (POTs), hired four Lateral Transfer officers, and an additional 58 POTs are undergoing training in current Academies. However, as of February 2007, authorized strength was minus 83 (545 of 628 authorized police officers, and 135 or 136 sergeants), due mainly to a higher than anticipated number of retirements (service and disability).

A Neighborhood Policing Plan Template

The *Harnett Report* strongly recommended: “The Oakland Police Department should abolish the watch commander system and establish a neighborhood-policing plan that provides true geographic accountability.” Area Command (geographic accountability) is a decentralized field deployment and command structure established to facilitate further implementation of the community policing philosophy and objectives of the Department. Community policing is a philosophy with three essential elements:

- Building and maintaining a mutual respect and partnership between the police and the community;
- A collaborative approach to the identification of problems and solutions; and
- An opportunity for officers to devote increased attention to problem resolution in a partnership with the community.

Under the previous Patrol 35 Area Command plan, deployment of field resources and the responsibilities of command were principally based on providing police services during specific time periods (watches). Area Command, as used in the *Harnett Report*, emphasizes delivering police services by **geographic** configuration, with 24 hours per day, seven-days per week accountability and resource deployment residing with the Area Commander (Captain of Police).

Though the *Harnett Report* suggests separating the City into four or more command areas led by a Captain of Police, the Department is opting to utilize three command areas:

Area I (North-West)	Beats 1-13
Area II (Central)	Beats 14-24
Area III (East)	Beats 25-35

Each Area Command will consist of personnel assigned to the following organizational units:

- Patrol Platoons
- Crime Reduction Teams(CRTs)

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- Foot Patrol Units (FPUs)
- Problem Solving Officers (PSOs)
- Evidence Technicians (sworn and non-sworn)
- Canine Handlers

Establishing an Accountability Forum

The *Harnett Report* opined that the OPD CrimeStop forum has lost focus and become cluttered with Departmental business unrelated to crime fighting. In addition, as structured, CrimeStop could not work as intended because there were no geographic commanders to hold accountable.

Revamping CrimeStop requires a more pronounced move from risk aversion (staying out of trouble) toward a proactive high-performance organization where all department units work together to reduce crime, fear, and disorder. This requires increased latitude for Area Commanders to implement nontraditional methods of deploying their resources based on a fast turnaround of Crime Analysis statistical data.

CrimeStop meetings provide a platform for discussing directly with the Department's executive staff organizational obstacles that may impede implementation of tactics or solutions to identified problems. The CrimeStop accountability forum in Oakland will continue its risk management focus (e.g., misconduct complaints, uses of force, vehicular accidents) while placing a renewed emphasis on the four principles of information-led crime reduction.

- **Timely and Accurate Crime Data**
Timely and accurate crime data are essential to effectively respond to problems throughout the City. This information must be disseminated daily to assist Area Command personnel in pinpointing where the crimes are being committed, how they are being committed; and who is committing them. The timeliness and accuracy of crime data information directly affects the efficacy of the police response.
- **Effective Tactics**
Developing an effective response requires careful analysis of crime information, evaluation of possible tactics with strong consideration of what has worked in the past, adoption of tactics based on facts, ensuring the tactics are far-reaching enough to effect change, and adaptable to the shifting crime trends and service demands.
- **Rapid Deployment**
Arming Area Command personnel with emerging crime trends or patterns allows for a strategic response where patrol, investigators, specialized units, and support personnel focus on problems in a coordinated effort.
- **Relentless Follow-Up and Assessment**
Recording data before and after the tactics have been deployed is necessary to assess the results of tactics employed, establish their validity, understand if the tactics worked and

which elements worked best, and determine when the problem has been abated. Every function of the Department — administrative, operational, and investigative — is evaluated by the results achieved. As such, problems identified in previous CrimeStop meetings require continuous discussion and monitoring.

Investigations and Other Crime-Fighting Issues

The Criminal Investigation Division (CID), as identified in the *Harnett Report*, is understaffed. Currently, there are ten investigators in the Homicide Section, eight investigators in the Robbery Section, eight investigators in the Assault Section, and twelve investigators in the Theft Section. CID assigned sworn administrative staff to augment investigative section resources.

Until additional personnel are available for assignment to sworn investigator positions, CID has instituted a mentor program for patrol officers during investigator callouts of serious or in custody offenses. This will accelerate organizational development by increasing the knowledge and skill of the patrol officers who function as preliminary investigators, and assist them with the “learning curve” when CID begins adding personnel. To increase efficiency, CID investigators utilize all available database and data-mining technologies to access state and federal information systems. Investigators also strive to link crimes to offenders through modus operandi, physical descriptions, salient characteristics, and DNA. CID is employing GPS technology to monitor and track high risk probationers and parolees.

As part of its on-going efforts to provide expedient and accurate identification and prosecution in criminal cases, OPD Crime Laboratory staff identified an urgent need for non-sworn classifications to work in the area of fingerprint analysis. To meet this need a new series of classification specifications: Latent Print Examiner I, Latent Print Examiner II and Latent Print Examiner III were approved by the City Council in March 2007. Hiring for those positions is underway.

CONCLUSION

As stated in the *Harnett Report*, OPD should focus its resources (patrol officers) on crime fighting. The best approach is through a geographic accountability structure. The Department should strive to fully implement community policing by expanding geographic accountability to the Patrol Division.

SUSTAINABLE OPPORTUNITIES

Economic: Area Command structure is designed to reduce crime, fear, and disorder, which will improve Oakland’s image both nationally and internationally. An improved image will attract new business, residents, and visitors.

Environmental: There are no environmental opportunities associated with this report.

Social Equity: Area Command may reduce police response times, and reduce crime and the fear of crime through the use of problem solving methods that attack the root causes of crime. These gains may trigger new retail and investment opportunities within the City of Oakland.


DISABILITY AND SENIOR CITIZEN ACCESS

There are no ADA or senior citizen access issues identified in this report

RECOMMENDATION AND RATIONALE

Staff recommends acceptance of this report.


Respectfully submitted,


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Attachment A: Crime Fighting in Oakland –
An Assessment of the
Oakland Police Department

APPROVED AND FORWARDED TO
THE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE:


Office of the City Administrator

Crime Fighting in Oakland

An Assessment of the Oakland Police Department



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December 28, 2006**

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Harnett Associates

Crime Fighting in Oakland

An Assessment of Oakland Police Department

I. Summary of Findings and Issues

Outgoing Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown engaged Harnett Associates to provide an assessment of the barriers to effective crime fighting in the City of Oakland. The Harnett Associates team of Patrick Harnett, Andrew Rosenzweig, and Bill Andrews spent eight days in Oakland, interviewing a variety of people within and outside the Oakland Police Department, observing police operations, assessing the police department's organizational chart, its reporting structure, and its lines of authority and responsibility, and reviewing reports and documents. Given the accelerated schedule of this project, Harnett Associates did not attempt a full analysis of all departmental operations and functions. Instead, they concentrated on the operational and structural issues directly related to the Oakland Police Department's capacity to counter rising crime trends. This report presents their findings and outlines a program of restructuring and reorganization. The consultants believe that this program, if fully implemented, will help transform Oakland Police Department from its current shift-driven approach to a successful information-led, community-policing model. They also believe that the new model will dramatically reduce violent crime and property crime and greatly improve the department's ability to deliver service in Oakland's many neighborhoods.

The City of Oakland and its police department face significant challenges in the next several years. Violent crime in the city spiked upward in 2006. As of December 12th, homicides had risen to 144 from 83 in the previous year for an increase of 73 percent. Robberies were up 30 percent to a total of 3,635, or more than ten robberies a day. The

totals for homicide and robbery are the highest in more than ten years and the total for overall violent crime is the highest since 1997. Given the indisputable fact that violence tends to feed on itself -- as killings are avenged, and revenge killings are themselves avenged, and as young robbers gain a familiarity with using guns and other violence against their victims -- the violence in Oakland could worsen in successive years. Yet, as currently staffed, organized and structured, the Oakland Police Department appears unable to focus on countering and driving down violent crime.

It should be strongly stated at the outset that this failure to focus is not the fault of individual police officers; their supervisors, or even the top managers of the organization. Indeed, the Oakland Police Department has numerous highly intelligent and motivated personnel in all ranks. The failure to focus is largely the consequence of deeply ingrained traditions about how to perform and organize effective police work, especially the watch commander system, which, in effect, removes the command structure of the department from any meaningful geographic accountability.

The Watch Commander System

The watch commander system divides the workday into three watches and assigns a captain and two lieutenants to each watch. As a matter of practice, there are many times when only one of these three supervisors is on duty during a given watch. The watch commander supervises patrol and response to 911 calls for the entire city for a ten-hour period. Watch commanders do not have any significant or ongoing contact with the public; they are not intimately familiar with the problems on each of the city's 35 beats; and they are not conversant with the crime trends and emerging crime patterns on the beats or in the city's larger police service areas. Although they are available to manage a breaking emergency or crisis, most of the time they are engaged in administrative functions that are largely divorced from what is going in the city. Watch commanders do not lead the department; they merely manage the patrol function. This is not because the captains and lieutenants assigned as watch commanders are incapable of leading. Rather, it is because the watch commander function does not position them or allow them to lead.

Lacking field commanders who are responsible for specific geographic areas of the city, the department's top chiefs and the Chief of Police himself have difficulty in directing, focusing, motivating, and energizing the department's patrol function. The top chiefs communicate with patrol through the watch commanders, and the watch commanders are fundamentally removed from the patrol function as it is actually performed by police officers and sergeants. In fact, the practical effect of the watch commander system is to devolve geographic responsibility to the sergeant and police officer level and to exempt deputy chiefs, captains and most lieutenants from any meaningful geographic responsibility and accountability.

The Police Service Areas

The Oakland Police Department has tried to establish geographic accountability with the Police Service Area (PSA) system. This system divides the city into six PSAs, which are each supervised by a lieutenant. Each lieutenant commands a contingent of problem-solving officers (PSOs) and a crime reduction team (CRT) who are supposed to serve as the police department's local problem-solving arm. In theory, these lieutenants have responsibility and accountability for their respective police service areas. In practice, the PSA system is an overlay on the watch commander system and provides only the semblance of accountability. The PSA lieutenants and their teams are only serving four days a week. Patrol and PSA officers both expressed the opinion that the criminals and other problem makers in various neighborhoods swiftly adapt to the schedules of the department's problem solvers. The PSA lieutenant has no control over patrol resources, nor can the watch commanders enlist problem-solving officers or crime reduction teams to answer 911 calls when the call load becomes heavy. PSA lieutenants and watch commanders rarely coordinate their activities, so patrol sergeants in the field are often unaware of PSA operations that are under way in their areas of responsibility. There is significant friction between the patrol and PSA sides of the house. Lastly, the PSA lieutenants report to a single captain who commands the Strategic Area Command (SAC) and, in turn, reports to the Chief of Police. This post is filled by a very energetic commander who has made the most of the Strategic Area Command position. Yet, he remains the only captain in the department with geographic responsibilities, and those responsibilities are spread across the entire city, necessarily reducing his effectiveness.

Beginning in January, SAC will report to the Deputy Chief of Field Operations, rather than the Chief of Police, but this administrative adjustment is not likely to alter the conditions that cause the PSA lieutenants and their squads to operate in relative isolation from the patrol squads.

District Captains and Geographic Accountability

The Oakland Police Department should abolish the watch commander system and establish a neighborhood-policing plan that provides true geographic accountability. At least half of the department's ten captains should be assigned to geographic districts and should command the patrol resources, the problem-solving officers and the crime reduction teams in their respective districts. Under this new system, the district captains will play a number of critical roles, essential both to crime fighting and serving the community:

- The district captain, both in person and operating through lieutenants, sergeants, primary beat officers, problem-solving officers and Crime Reduction Teams will be the primary police contact and problem solver for the community. A good district captain will know community leaders and work hard to deliver police services they request, synchronizing and coordinating their needs and requests with the overall strategic direction provided by the Chief of Police.
- The district captain and his lieutenants will also be the district's primary crime analysts, reading each and every report of crime occurring in their area of responsibility, as one of their first daily priorities. They will be thoroughly conversant with crime incidents and emerging crime patterns, including homicides, rapes, robberies, burglaries and auto thefts. To a surprising degree, top managers in many traditionally organized police departments spend little time thinking about crime and countering crime. That must change in Oakland if the department is to achieve a sharp focus on lowering its violent crime rates.
- As the community-policing leader for the district, the district captain will be the primary and highly visible director of all police resources within the district, including all patrol resources, and the primary planner of all police operations within the district, with the occasional exception of longer-term investigations conducted by the Criminal Investigation Division. This arrangement allows the captain to function

as a true strategic planner within the district, allocating resources to crime problems, quality-of-life issues, 911-call issues, and other issues as they develop.

- The district captain will be an advocate for the needs of the district within the hierarchy of the police department and the city government. Many problem-solving efforts, especially those that require multi-departmental efforts, are most effectively advocated by a manager of sufficient stature to persuade other managers both in the police department and in other city departments of exigent needs. For instance, a problem-solving officer asking the Criminal Investigations Division to pay close attention to a recurrent robbery pattern has significantly less influence than a captain making an identical request.

Implementing a workable neighborhood-policing plan will require a number of organizational changes in the Oakland Police Department, which are described in more detail in Section II of this report.

The Compstat Accountability Forum

Once a true geographic system, staffed by district captains, has been established, the Oakland police department can develop a command accountability forum on the model of New York City's *Compstat* and similar command accountability forums in use in police departments around the nation and around the world. The current accountability forum – called *Crime Stop* – has lost all focus on crime. The meeting is cluttered with non-crime-related business and lacks the intense focus on crime incidents and patterns that has made *Compstat* an extremely successful crime-fighting tool. In addition, *Crime Stop*, as currently structured, did not work in Oakland – and could not have worked – because there are almost no geographic managers to hold accountable. In a police department without geographic commanders, the *Compstat* exercise becomes a charade of accountability. Yet, without *Compstat*, the geographic model risks losing strategic oversight and drive.

A *Compstat*-like forum will provide an opportunity for the top chiefs of the organization to participate in and to actually manage the crime-fighting efforts of the Oakland Police Department. In weekly sessions, they will closely question district commanders and their lieutenants, as well as investigative and other special unit commanders, about the

progress of the department's ongoing work, keeping the focus sharp, brokering the use of limited resources, probing the effectiveness and thoroughness of current operations and investigations, and driving the organization to higher levels of performance. The ability of the Oakland Police Department to focus on and engage in crime reduction, from the chiefs on down, will be greatly enhanced. The *Crime Stop* accountability forum is further discussed in Section III of this report.

Staffing and Measure Y

Although the structural and operational issues described above are critical to improving the crime-fighting performance of the Oakland Police Department, there are other significant impediments undercutting performance. The first and most obvious is staffing. By the standards of many other American police departments, Oakland, with an authorized strength of 802 (including Measure Y officers who have yet to be hired) is understaffed to serve a population of more than 400,000, fielding fewer than 20 officers per 10,000 residents. In contrast, New York City fields more than 40 officers per 10,000 residents and Washington D.C. fields about 60. Yet, even within the authorization, Oakland is experiencing shortages. A recent Bureau of Field Operations roster shows 11 police officer vacancies on First Watch, 14 on Second Watch, and 13 on Third Watch. The department is staffing 115 beats on overtime each week. The Criminal Investigations Division has lost 13 personnel in the past two years without any replacements. The Department has only 10 homicide investigators and only seven robbery investigators, or less than one robbery investigator for every 500 robberies reported in 2006. Recruiting qualified police officer applicants and retaining them throughout the training process is proving increasingly difficult.

Measure Y provides some relief. It increases the authorized strength of the department from 739 to 802. The 63 additional officers provided by Measure Y are the only reinforcements the Oakland Police Department is likely to receive in the next several years. But the 63 officers may be used only in the community policing roles specified by the measure. These roles are:

- 43 neighborhood-beat officers assigned to community-policing beats. There are fifty-seven community-policing beats as defined by council resolution, and each beat is supposed to be assigned its own problem-solving officer.
- Six community-policing and problem-solving sergeants to supervise the neighborhood-beat officers.
- Four school-resource officers to respond to school safety and truancy issues.
- Six crime-reduction-team (CRT) officers to augment the six existing crime reduction teams.
- Four officers to work specifically on domestic violence and child abuse intervention, teamed with social service providers.

The Measure Y resources have been committed before they have been hired. They cannot be used to shore up patrol or investigations, the two areas of the department suffering the greatest shortages. In the view of the sponsors of Measure Y, assigning police officers permanently to small neighborhoods of approximately 7,000 residents each is the most effective way to prevent crime, implement community policing and ensure community service. Yet, understaffing patrol weakens the department's ability to deliver service when people need it most, i.e., during emergencies; and understaffing investigations undercuts one of the most effective methods of preventing crime -- identifying, arresting and imprisoning repeat and pattern offenders who repeatedly prey on the citizens of Oakland.

Community Policing in Oakland

In strictly allotting new police to specified "community policing" roles, the well-intentioned Measure Y fundamentally undercuts how successful community policing ought to work. In the police departments that have most effectively delivered community service, community policing is not a program, or a group of specialists, or a unit or a team. Rather, it is an organizational commitment that permeates a department, engaging sworn and non-sworn members and becoming part of department culture.

The central ideas of Community Policing are beyond dispute. A police department that fails to work with local communities and to make alliances with citizens will never be as

effective as a department that does. Having officers regularly work the same beats and develop a familiarity with problems and conditions on those beats increases a police department's store of intelligence about actual neighborhood conditions and enhances its ability to correct conditions in a timely fashion. Yet, community-policing orthodoxy has tended to exaggerate the capacities of individual police officers to solve problems single-handedly, especially in densely populated and crime-stressed urban areas. As most police managers know, effective problem solving in these kinds of neighborhoods requires a team effort, which an individual police officer can rarely organize and direct. In many instances, community policing models that rely too heavily on the local officer have degenerated into comfortable working hours for the community policing officer, make-work projects that have little impact on the community's real problems, and special servicing by the police of community activists at the expense of the community as a whole.

In the view of the consultants, the heavy emphasis on the role of the local officer working the small beat also has the unintended consequences of exacerbating the problems that result from the watch commander system in Oakland. The watch commander system, the community-beat system and the designated-specialist-PSO model all devolve responsibility and accountability down to the lowest ranks of the organization and generally exempt the higher-ranking managers from real responsibility for the success or failure of various community initiatives. The consultants believe that a neighborhood-policing plan that assigns captains as leaders and managers of local districts will provide a much more effective community-policing and problem-solving framework. These captains have the experience, skill, and authority to tackle complex crime and quality-of-life problems and to make real and swift progress against those problems. The consultants believe that these district captains would be even more effective if they were granted more latitude in the use of the officers assigned to the neighborhoods under Measure Y. Problems do not divide themselves into neat 7,000-person demographic segments, and captains serving as district managers should have authority to strategically address the full range of problems they encounter across their districts. The result will be far superior police service to the neighborhoods that need it most.

Lastly, in crime-stressed urban neighborhoods, felony crime is usually the most important problem in need of solution. As an Oakland PSA lieutenant interviewed by the consultants remarked, "I need my problem-solving officers to make arrests." Neighborhoods with serious felony crime problems can ill afford to have problem-solving officers concentrating exclusively on community contact and quality-of-life initiatives. In these neighborhoods, and indeed throughout the City of Oakland, crime fighting is community policing because the community as a whole faces a worsening violent crime crisis. People are dying in the streets of Oakland; they are being shot and robbed and burglarized, and it is the police department's job to do something about it. Every citizen in Oakland will be better served if the violent crime problems can be brought under control. The district-policing model, with the districts commanded by captains, is the best option for achieving that goal.

The Negotiated Settlement Agreement

The Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) dates from 2002 when the City of Oakland reached a settlement with plaintiffs suing in connection with "The Riders" case of 2000, in which four Oakland Police officers were accused of excessive force, planting evidence, and fabricating reports. The NSA established an independent monitoring team (IMT), under the direction of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, which monitors progress on 51 specified tasks that the police department must accomplish to a level of 95 percent compliance over five years.

Harnett Associates did not closely review the NSA agreement, and the independent monitoring team declined to meet with the consultants. Harnett Associates can report, however, that the provisions of the NSA are regarded by most Oakland police officers as an extremely onerous burden that has severely damaged department efficiency and morale. Interestingly, many of these same officers freely acknowledge that, prior to the NSA, the department was far too lax in its record keeping and accountability systems and that field supervision was often haphazard. Yet, they maintain that the current NSA requirements in the areas of police use of force and civilian complaints against police officers are so exacting that they have the effect of disabling the department's efforts against crime.

Use-of-force reporting requirements were frequently cited as onerous by police officers, sergeants and lieutenants. The reports are said to be extremely time consuming, tying up sergeants, who investigate the use-of-force incidents and prepare the reports, as they memorialize the details of routine uses of force, such as tackling an arrestee, in which no one was injured and no one has complained. Worse, many Oakland police officers and supervisors believe that police officers are much less likely to intervene in discretionary situations, not because they are afraid of confrontations on the streets, but because they fear the use-of-force reporting implications should such confrontations escalate to a level that requires them to take forceful police action. Many officers attribute the decline in OPD felony and misdemeanor arrests to the NSA. This may be debatable because arrests were declining in the late 1990s, but the rate accelerated after 2002, especially for misdemeanor arrests. While misdemeanor arrests fell by about 29 percent between 1997 and 2002, they declined 45 percent between 2002 and 2005.

The NSA's heavy emphasis on Internal Affairs investigations of complaints against officers is seen by many officers as disproportionate, especially in a department that is both understaffed and currently under siege by rising violent crime. The consultants were told multiple times that Internal Affairs is the largest investigative unit in the department, and the issue is clearly a sore point with police officers. IA has more investigators (12) than homicide (10), as well as 12 additional sworn staff and seven civilian staff, for a total of 31 personnel compared with 14 in the homicide unit.

Harnett Associates recognizes the importance of an effective Internal Affairs Division and of vigorous field supervision, including the presence of sergeants at the scenes of arrests and police uses of force. The consultants certainly acknowledge the paramount importance of thoroughly investigating any credible complaints lodged by citizens against police officers. Still, the consultants believe the requirements of the NSA could be streamlined and modified so that these procedures interfere less with crime fighting, service delivery and active field supervision by sergeants, who currently spend substantial time off patrol preparing reports and are therefore less available to manage ongoing patrol operations. In the consultants' experience, ensuring police integrity and

preventing police abuse are rarely accomplished solely by outside monitoring and report writing. Rather, they are accomplished by active supervision by sergeants, lieutenants and captains who set standards and enforce them for the personnel under their management.

Just as the watch commander system and the community-policing-officer model place most responsibility on police officers and sergeants, some of the provisions of the NSA also tend devolve responsibility down to the sergeants, who carry the bulk of the personnel monitoring and report-writing responsibilities to the detriment of their primary function of first-line supervision and leadership. In contrast, the neighborhood-policing model, with captains commanding geographic districts, provides an opportunity to involve captains and lieutenants in the key management functions of directing, leading, inspiring and disciplining police rank and file toward the highest standards of integrity and community service.

Jumpstarting Organizational Change

Reorganizing the Oakland Police Department to achieve crime reduction goals will be a difficult and complex undertaking. Even more than most bureaucracies, police organizations resist change. This is partly because police officers learn much about how to do their jobs in the streets from their immediate supervisors and their fellow officers. Cultural traditions about how the job is done are deeply ingrained, and suspicion of outside perspectives and outside advice runs high. Officers who have grown up in the watch-commander system are likely to be deeply skeptical that any other system can actually work. In fact, many community policing initiatives, in many police departments, have foundered on the skepticism of such officers, as the advocates for change failed to convince police officers in the field that what they were advocating was "fighting crime" and "real police work." To swiftly improve Oakland's crime-fighting capabilities, it is essential to overcome this skepticism and to enlist the enthusiastic support of the rank and file and their sergeants for the change process.

Ranking officers -- lieutenants, captains, and even chiefs -- may be skeptical as well. Coming up through the ranks of a single police department, many police managers have

never had the experience of participating in the wholesale organizational transformation of a police organization and may not know what is possible. As associates of Bill Bratton, the Los Angeles police chief and the former police commissioner of New York City, the members of the Harnett Associates team have had this experience multiple times. All three consultants participated in the turnaround of the New York City Police Department in 1994 and 1995, a transformation that is still paying crime-reduction dividends today. Serving more recently as the chief of police in Hartford, Connecticut, Mr. Harnett, with Mr. Rosenzweig acting as his deputy chief, led the Hartford Police Department from a watch-commander system to a neighborhood-policing plan staffed by district captains. As deputy chief of police in Providence, Rhode Island, Mr. Rosenzweig was instrumental in a similar transformation of the Providence Police Department. Although smaller than Oakland – Hartford has a population of 124,000 and Providence has a population of 175,000 – both cities have similar demographic and crime profiles to Oakland's. More significantly, both cities are now experiencing reductions in crime and violence as a result of new systems that make police supervisors responsible and accountable for manageable geographic areas within each city.

Based on these experiences, the consultants recommend developing not only a workable plan for restructuring the department, but also a strategy for engaging with the department's personnel and culture as that plan is developed. Section V of this report outlines such a strategy. As a police organization becomes more effective, its personnel, even some of its cynical personnel, gain energy and focus, further enhancing the effectiveness. There is no force multiplier like success. One of the great advantages of reorganizing for crime reduction goals is the power such reorganization can unleash in the men and women of a police organization. Then, with police captains taking responsibility for geographic areas in the city, top chiefs driving the crime-fighting process through a *Compstat*-style accountability forum, and police officers responding to invigorated leadership, the Oakland Police Department can win the battle against crime and secure safety and civility for the neighborhoods of a great American city.

II. A Neighborhood Policing Plan Template

The detailed reorganization plan for the Oakland Police Department should be developed by the Oakland police management team. Not only do they have a far greater familiarity with the city and its problems than outside consultants could ever achieve, but they are also the ones who will have to implement the new plan and work within its framework. The team should work under a strict time frame and with a sense of urgency. The resultant plan should be data-based, detailed and specific as to the number of personnel assigned and tours they will be working. What follows here is a template and recommendations for such a reorganization that can and should be adapted during the planning process.

- Establish four, five, or six geographic police districts in Oakland, each commanded by a captain, assisted by two lieutenants. Each captain will have command patrol resources, problem-solving officers (PSOs), and a crime response team (CRT).
- Establish an *assistant chief* or *first deputy chief* rank between the rank of chief of police and the rank of deputy chief, who would serve as Chief of Operations for the department, commanding both patrol and investigative resources. This commander would be charged with leading the department's attack on violent crime and with running the department's *Crime Stop* meetings. Because the Chief of Police is responsible for managing the entire department, including the heavy burden of NSA compliance and administrative reform, the consultants believe that there is a compelling argument to establish a second in command who is primarily concerned with driving the department to better performance against crime. This, indeed, is what was done in the NYPD, in the reform period of 1994-1996, when the Chief of Department, reporting to the police commissioner and running the *Compstat* process, drove a huge decline in the city's violent crime over three years.
- Divide the city between two deputy chiefs, one functioning as the West commander and the other as the East commander and each responsible for two to three districts. The district captains would report to their respective deputy chiefs. The deputy chiefs would report to the assistant chief. This system may, at first glance, appear to provide an excess of high-ranking supervision for the patrol and


district system. The consultants do not think so. To mount an effective campaign against crime in Oakland, it will be necessary to directly involve the department's chiefs in crime fighting and crime management. In many traditionally organized departments, top chiefs are promoted to the level of high functionaries who oversee but do not directly manage. This is a waste of chief experience and expertise, especially in a city with a rising crime problem. In Oakland, most of the deputy chiefs should be positioned in the organization so that they can play decisive roles in the fight against crime. Deputy chiefs should be in the field responding to critical incidents, taking ownership and responsibility, and showing the field officers command presence, interest and support.

A proposed revised organization chart follows on the next page. In the interests of clarity, the chart shows only the operational units of the department, as well as the Office of the Inspector General and the Internal Affairs Division. The Bureau of Services and the Bureau of Administration also report to the Chief of Police.

- Establish a duty chief and duty captain schedule under which all chiefs and captains would rotate this responsibility, so that one chief and one captain would be on call at all times and expected to appear at the scenes of homicides and other major events in the city.
- Establish the deputy chief of the Criminal Investigations Bureau position as a direct report to the Chief of Operations. This arrangement will enable the Chief of Operations, who will serve as the department's primary crime fighter, to strategically manage detective resources as well as patrol resources. As will be discussed further in Section IV of this report, the prioritization and the focus of criminal investigations are an extremely important part of any effort to significantly reduce crime.
- Eliminate the watch commander function for 2nd and 3rd Watches (morning and evening shifts), with the geographic captains and their lieutenants performing this function in each geographic district.
- Assign a headquarters captain working five days a week to perform administrative functions, including staffing overtime tours, scheduling the headquarters

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT

Proposed Organizational Chart *(Not Meant to be All Inclusive)*



*Note: * All Patrol Officers & Sergeants, all Three Watches ... plus Crime Reduction Teams and Problem Solving Officers Report to Their District Commander.*

lieutenant coverage, and ensuring there is supervisor coverage in districts when district captains and lieutenants are unavailable.

- Assign a single headquarters lieutenant on 2nd and 3rd Watches. This supervisor will assist the headquarters captain, conduct lineups for various tours and be available to respond to critical incidents, homicides, serious shootings, etc. when the district captain/lieutenants concerned are not available. In these instances, the headquarters captain/lieutenant will take charge and make notifications and decisions pending the arrival of command staff from the district in question. Vacancies in the headquarters lieutenant schedule will be filled on a no more than one-or-two-day rotation by district lieutenants.
- Retain a citywide lieutenant commander post for 1st Watch (the night shift, also called the Dog Watch), to be staffed by two lieutenants serving in rotation. Any holes in the Dog Watch commander schedule will be filled by district lieutenants serving on overtime on a voluntary basis.
- Allow the district captains in the geographic districts maximum authority (within a structured and open transfer and promotion process) to assign the personnel and hours for problem-solving officers (PSOs) and CRT units. The captains should be able to cultivate their best and most active patrol officers and reward them with interesting and proactive assignments. They should be responsible for the productivity of the officers in their command, including professional development, training and evaluation of officers and, in some instances, the disciplining of officers who do not perform up to standards. They should also, within reason, be able to set the hours of the officers working in proactive assignments to ensure that these critical police resources are available to counter specific neighborhood problems when they are occurring.
- The consultants strongly urge that the city of Oakland and the department revisit and take a broader interpretation of how new police officers authorized by Measure Y may be utilized to allow district commanders more latitude in using these officers. For instance, given that crime fighting is a critical component of an effective community policing program and that most crimes are local, some of the problem-solving officers (PSOs) provided under Measure Y might be best

employed, for at least of part of their time, conducting preliminary investigations on local patterns of burglary, auto theft, and robbery.

- Re-assign school resource officers (SROs), who currently report to the Campus Life and School Safety Unit (CLASS) in the Criminal Investigation Division, to district commands. School safety should be under the direction of district captains to maintain an awareness of school conditions and concerns within the district commands.
- Return the neighborhood service coordinators, currently assigned to the office of the City Administrator, to the police department and provide a neighborhood service coordinator to work under the direction of each district police captain. The neighborhood service coordinators will provide additional problem-solving capabilities to the district captain, who will be able to coordinate the work of problem-solving officers and the CRT team with initiatives involving the rest of the city government.
- Give strong consideration to restoring the title of *Police Service Technician*. Workers in this title used to supplement the patrol force, responding to and taking reports on cold burglary and auto theft calls, arranging for the towing of abandoned vehicles, directing traffic, taking accident reports, and performing other police functions that do not require the presence of a sworn police officer. These titles reportedly were cut in the 1990s in a budget economy measure. Given the cost of police officers and the shortage of police officers in Oakland, it seems to the consultants that cutting the *Police Service Technician* title was a false economy. Well-managed police service technicians might be able to pick up enough work to reduce the need for mandatory police overtime. Regardless of economic savings, the police service technicians would probably deliver far better service to Oakland citizens on low priority calls than is available now.
- Within about six months of establishing the neighborhood-policing plan, the OPD should begin turning out half the patrol force at the Eastmont facility in East Oakland, which should be established as full-service facility under the command of the East deputy chief. The Eastmont facility presents an opportunity to decentralize police management and presence with little capital cost. Along with serving as a base for patrol officers, problem-solving officers, crime reduction

teams, and possibly some investigators. Eastmont should also be equipped to respond to walk-in inquiries, to take crime reports and to host community meetings.

- Also within about six months of implementing the neighborhood plan, the department should conduct a thorough review of current patrol beat configurations, taking into account calls for service, crime, population, and geographic features to determine the most efficient distribution of beats. A cursory review of beat workload data, showed large variations in workload on the 35 beats. This is not at all surprising considering the beat structure has not be adjusted in more than ten years. The department should also evaluate time-of-day and day-of-week data on calls for service and crime to ensure that peak manpower coincides with peak demands and needs.
- Establish a weekly *Crime Stop* or *Compstat*-style meeting of department commanders that focuses exclusively and specifically on crime and emerging patterns of crime. District captains and lieutenants would be closely questioned about current specific crimes and crime trends and their plans and tactics to reverse those trends. The *Crime Stop* meeting is discussed in detail in Section III of this report.

III. Establishing an Accountability Forum

Compstat is a system of command accountability developed by the NYPD in the mid-1990s. Initially using area maps with acetate overlays displaying colored dots representing different crimes and arrests, *Compstat* quickly adopted computer-mapping technology and rapid analysis of crime. As it is used today, *Compstat* brings together the police commanders from a city to intensively review crime patterns and police tactics at regular strategy meetings. Using the computer maps as a guide, the *Compstat* sessions zero in on specific crime conditions and on the specific patrol and investigative tactics being used to counter these conditions. The purpose of *Compstat* is to motivate and direct the police bureaucracy, ensuring that all possible steps are being taken in the urgent business of fighting crime and protecting the public.

Compstat's advantages include clear command accountability for addressing emerging crime patterns and problems; the coordination of police resources, including investigative and narcotics resources (or, in Oakland's case, *Special Operations Group* resources) toward effective problem solving; and the rapid replication of successful strategies and tactics throughout a city's neighborhoods. Widely perceived to have been the driving force behind a more than 70 percent decline in New York City crime, *Compstat* has been emulated by a number of big-city and mid-sized-city police departments in the U.S. and abroad.

As already mentioned in the first section of this report, the *Crime Stop* meeting conducted by the Oakland Police Department bears no resemblance to a genuine crime-fighting meeting. The consultants are convinced that Oakland, confronted as it is with steeply rising crime trends, must develop a *Compstat*-like forum to help the department focus its crime-fighting efforts. In this section the consultants describe how to make *Crime Stop* an effective *Compstat*-like process.

- Limit the *Crime Stop* meeting to crime and related topics. *Crime Stop* sessions should never be conducted as part of meetings with a broader business agenda.

The message of *Crime Stop* is that crime is not like the other business conducted by a police department. Crime issues are urgent, pressing, and vital, and the core mission of the police.

- Maintain a formal atmosphere. The occasional joke or levity is permissible, but the meeting should not be allowed to degenerate into an informal roundtable discussion. The police field manager who is presenting, whether a district captain or a special unit commander, should stand at a centrally placed podium across from the top chief who runs the meeting.
- Identify a "crime fighter" to lead the *Crime Stop* meeting and question the police captains and lieutenants presenting at the podium. The consultants use the term crime fighter as shorthand for a hands-on operational boss who knows police work well, who has a passion for excellence in performance of police functions, and who is willing to demand high performance from the department's field managers. Standing at the podium in a room full of ranking bosses and your peers and being quizzed can be a daunting experience. Presenters at *Crime Stop* should never be subject to public ridicule, but they should be subject to sharp, directed questions regarding their core business.
- Delve into the details of crimes and crime patterns. Poorly run *Compstat* meetings tend to emphasize general crime trends and the use of bar charts and fever charts. General trends can be a departure point for *Crime Stop* discussions, but the discussions themselves should focus on the particulars of specific crimes. What do we know about the robbers who are robbing Asian victims in a 20 square-block area? Do all officers working the district have a copy of the suspect sketch that detectives have prepared? Have investigators been showing photos to cooperating victims? Can patrol schedules be adjusted to increase the possibility of catching the robbers in the act? Can problem-solving officers or a crime reduction team stake out one of the more active locations for these robberies? Would it be worth it to mount a decoy operation? These kinds of detailed discussions often lead to the ad hoc development of tactics and solutions to address current problems.
- Assign personnel to record the key decisions and commitments made at each *Crime Stop* meeting. Each meeting should produce an *Action Item* list for use at

the next meeting. The *Action Item* list would show all the actions agreed upon at the meeting and the personnel responsible for accomplishing those actions. At successive *Crimes Stop* meetings participants can be questioned about progress on the action items.

- Develop a weekly crime comparison statistics report (*Compstat* report) showing crime and arrest statistics citywide and for each district. This report would include:
 - Current-week Part I crime incidents and arrest activity in comparison with the previous week and the same week in the previous year
 - Current month-to-date Part I crime incidents and arrest activity in comparison with the same month in the previous year
 - Current year-to-date Part I crime incidents and arrest activity in comparison with the previous year

This report will become the easy reference on crime conditions showing at a glance where crime has grown or diminished in the past week and the longer-term trends. The report may also include other important indicators such as shootings and shooting victims and the number of narcotics arrests and misdemeanor arrests. The report should be generated each week without fail and distributed to all district captains and special unit commanders as swiftly as possible. (See attached sample *Crime Stop* report)

- Rename the OPD Crime Analysis Unit the *Crime Stop* unit and make the unit a direct report to new Chief of Operations. Increase staffing to ensure the timely preparation of the *Crime Stop* report and computer crime maps needed for each *Crime Stop* meeting. Crime analysis staff can assist the Chief of Operations in maintaining a familiarity with developing crime trends and patterns throughout the city.

A sample Crime Stop report follows on the next pages. This report is for illustrative purposes only, and the data shown is not meant to be accurate.

Oakland Police Department

2006

CRIME STOP REPORT

Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

**FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES
SAMPLE DATA ONLY**



Oakland Police Save Lives

CITY OF OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT ... WAYNE G. TUCKER, CHIEF OF POLICE

OAKLAND POLICE 2006 WEEKLY REPORT

CITYWIDE - SAMPLE DATA, FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

Crime Activity

Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

PART I: CRIME

	WEEK			28 DAY PERIOD			YEAR TO DATE			2 YR		PREVIOUS WEEK		PREVIOUS 28 DAYS	
	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2004	% change	2006	% change	2006	% change
MURDER	3	4	33.3%	7	11	57.1%	87	142	63.2%	83	71.1%	5	-20.0%	7	57.1%
RAPE	0	3	300.0%	18	27	50.0%	184	158	-15.9%	189	-15.9%	9	-66.7%	12	125.0%
ROBBERY	30	27	-10.0%	165	120	-27.3%	1840	2091	12.4%	2547	-17.9%	18	50.0%	171	-29.8%
AGG ASSAULT	51	30	-41.2%	174	123	-29.3%	1860	2007	7.9%	1623	23.7%	27	11.1%	171	-28.1%
BURGLARY	57	60	5.3%	252	216	-14.3%	3981	3198	-19.1%	4878	-34.4%	42	42.9%	285	-24.2%
LARCENY	327	255	-22.0%	1467	1068	-27.4%	17843	16734	-6.2%	18468	-9.4%	213	19.7%	1491	-28.6%
AUTO THEFT	151	63	-58.3%	523	339	-34.9%	5187	4755	-8.3%	7302	-34.9%	81	-22.2%	330	2.7%
TOTALS	609	442	-27.4%	2506	1901	-24.1%	30777	29086	-5.8%	35090	-17.1%	398	11.9%	2467	-22.9%
SHOOT INCIDENTS	9	11	33.3%	33	38	8.1%	426	448	5.2%	405	14.3%	9	33.3%	39	-7.7%
SHOOTING VICTIMS	9	12	33.3%	42	39	-7.1%	489	561	14.9%	468	19.9%	9	33.3%	45	-13.3%

ARREST ACTIVITY Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

	WEEK			28 DAY PERIOD			YEAR TO DATE			2 YR		PREVIOUS WEEK		PREVIOUS 28 DAYS	
	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2004	% change	2006	% change	2006	% change
MURDER	6	3	-50.0%	9	6	-33.3%	123	120	-2.4%	126	-4.8%	0	300.0%	9	-33.3%
RAPE	0	3	300.0%	6	18	200.0%	114	126	10.5%	165	-23.6%	6	-90.0%	9	100.0%
ROBBERY	6	8	33.3%	18	21	16.7%	435	507	16.6%	921	-2.9%	6	6.9%	30	-90.0%
AGG ASSAULT	21	24	14.3%	87	84	-3.4%	1071	1110	3.6%	1317	-15.7%	15	60.0%	98	-6.7%
BURGLARY	9	15	66.7%	60	33	-45.0%	789	720	-8.1%	792	-9.1%	9	86.7%	69	-52.2%
LARCENY	27	60	122.2%	174	278	58.6%	1936	2922	49.4%	2301	27.0%	57	5.3%	273	1.1%
AUTO THEFT	12	12	0.0%	24	39	62.5%	483	430	-10.8%	488	-14.1%	5	100.0%	24	62.5%
TOTAL PT I ARRESTS	81	117	44.4%	378	477	26.2%	4843	5925	21.8%	5712	3.7%	83	28.9%	584	-5.4%
SIMPLE ARST	231	222	-3.9%	876	771	-11.8%	9843	10719	10.3%	10719	0.0%	108	31.1%	798	-3.7%
OWB	6	16	266.7%	45	78	73.3%	574	774	34.4%	688	28.0%	33	-45.5%	84	-44.4%
PROSTITUTION	0	0	0.0%	24	39	62.5%	281	357	26.0%	564	-36.7%	30	-3000.0%	48	-18.8%
NARCOTICS	207	180	-13.0%	489	678	38.7%	7488	8992	18.8%	9078	-2.0%	135	33.3%	843	34.9%
D/C - BOP	156	123	-21.2%	465	398	-16.1%	6255	6564	4.9%	6504	8.9%	99	24.2%	609	-36.0%
OTHER	218	253	15.1%	744	846	13.7%	9527	11548	20.2%	10620	8.8%	129	84.5%	789	8.5%
TOTAL ALL ARRESTS	897	915	2.0%	3021	3279	8.6%	38733	44799	15.7%	43797	2.3%	886	31.5%	3336	-1.7%

OAKLAND POLICE 2006 WEEKLY REPORT

DISTRICT ONE - SAMPLE DATA, FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

Crime Activity Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

PART I CRIME	WEEK			28 DAY PERIOD			YEAR TO DATE			2 YR		PREVIOUS WEEK		PREVIOUS 28 DAYS	
	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2004	% change	2005	% change	2005	% change
MURDER	0	0	0.0%	1	1	0.0%	13	9	-30.8%	15	-40.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.0%
RAPE	0	3	300.0%	9	9	0.0%	72	57	-20.8%	42	35.7%	6	-50.0%	3	200.0%
ROBBERY	3	3	0.0%	42	27	-35.7%	492	423	-14.0%	633	-33.2%	12	-75.0%	42	-35.7%
AGG ASSAULT	15	15	0.0%	78	45	-42.3%	789	774	-1.9%	756	2.4%	15	0.0%	48	-6.3%
BURGLARY	9	12	33.3%	72	39	-45.8%	759	831	9.5%	996	-16.8%	12	0.0%	96	-59.4%
LARCENY	45	75	66.7%	315	186	-41.0%	3453	2907	-15.8%	3678	-21.0%	45	66.7%	279	-33.3%
AUTO THEFT	15	9	-40.0%	66	42	-36.4%	1056	891	-15.6%	1746	-49.0%	18	-50.0%	69	-39.1%
TOTALS	87	117	34.5%	583	349	-40.1%	6434	5892	-11.2%	7866	-25.1%	108	8.3%	538	-35.1%
SHOOT INCIDENTS	6	3	-50.0%	24	18	-25.0%	240	234	-2.5%	255	-8.2%	3	0.0%	15	20.0%
SHOOTING VICTIMS	6	3	-50.0%	33	21	-36.4%	287	297	11.2%	289	3.1%	3	0.0%	15	40.0%

ARREST ACTIVITY Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

PART I CRIME	WEEK			28 DAY PERIOD			YEAR TO DATE			2 YR		PREVIOUS WEEK		PREVIOUS 28 DAYS	
	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2004	% change	2005	% change	2005	% change
MURDER	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	69	75	8.7%	69	8.7%	0	0.0%	9	-900.0%
RAPE	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	66	60	-9.1%	111	-45.9%	0	0.0%	9	-900.0%
ROBBERY	0	0	0.0%	6	0	-600.0%	174	153	-12.1%	150	2.0%	0	0.0%	21	-2100.0%
AGG ASSAULT	9	12	33.3%	45	36	-20.0%	546	540	-1.1%	648	-16.7%	9	33.3%	30	20.0%
BURGLARY	6	9	50.0%	30	12	-60.0%	303	291	-4.0%	261	11.5%	3	200.0%	24	-90.0%
LARCENY	12	33	175.0%	99	114	15.2%	747	1158	55.0%	1008	14.9%	9	266.7%	89	15.2%
AUTO THEFT	3	9	200.0%	3	18	500.0%	162	150	-7.4%	189	-20.6%	6	50.0%	3	900.0%
TOTAL PT I ARRESTS	30	63	110.0%	183	180	-1.6%	2067	2427	17.4%	2436	-0.4%	27	133.3%	195	-7.7%
SIMPLE ASST	93	96	3.2%	447	375	-16.1%	4728	5232	10.7%	5112	2.3%	69	39.1%	333	12.6%
GUN	0	9	900.0%	9	27	200.0%	270	327	21.1%	243	34.6%	12	-25.0%	21	26.6%
PROSTITUTION	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%	45	33	-26.7%	114	-71.1%	0	0.0%	3	-900.0%
NARCOTICS	93	81	-12.9%	240	295	22.9%	3306	4323	30.8%	4104	5.3%	75	8.0%	264	8.0%
D/C - BOP	60	69	15.0%	165	183	10.9%	2448	2865	4.8%	2352	9.1%	24	187.5%	192	-4.7%
OTHER	105	141	34.3%	366	450	23.0%	5109	6219	21.7%	5871	5.9%	75	88.0%	429	4.9%
TOTAL ALL ARRESTS	381	459	20.5%	1410	1500	6.4%	17973	21126	17.5%	20232	4.4%	282	62.8%	1437	4.4%

OAKLAND POLICE 2006 WEEKLY REPORT

DISTRICT TWO - SAMPLE DATA, FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

Crime Activity Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

PART I CRIME	WEEK			28 DAY PERIOD			YEAR TO DATE			2 YR		PREVIOUS WEEK		PREVIOUS 28 DAYS	
	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2004	% change	2005	% change	2005	% change
MURDER	1	2	100.0%	2	5	150.0%	18	28	61.1%	16	81.3%	1	100.0%	4	25.0%
RAPE	0	0	0.0%	6	6	0.0%	45	45	0.0%	42	7.1%	0	0.0%	3	100.0%
ROBBERY	12	12	0.0%	24	45	87.5%	342	429	25.4%	552	-22.3%	3	300.0%	39	15.4%
AGG ASSAULT	12	3	-75.0%	33	27	-18.2%	291	378	29.9%	201	88.1%	3	0.0%	27	0.0%
BURGLARY	12	12	0.0%	51	54	5.9%	657	696	5.9%	903	-22.9%	6	100.0%	66	-18.2%
LARCENY	57	42	-26.3%	252	204	-19.0%	3288	2979	-9.4%	3750	-20.6%	45	-6.7%	273	-25.3%
AUTO THEFT	51	6	-88.2%	84	60	-28.6%	1053	909	-13.7%	1665	-45.4%	12	-50.0%	63	-4.8%
TOTALS	145	77	-46.9%	452	401	-11.3%	5694	5465	-4.0%	7129	-23.3%	70	10.0%	473	-15.6%
SHOOT INCIDENTS	3	3	0.0%	6	6	0.0%	54	69	27.8%	39	76.9%	0	300.0%	6	0.0%
SHOOTING VICTIMS	3	3	0.0%	6	6	0.0%	63	81	28.6%	42	92.9%	0	300.0%	9	-33.3%

ARREST ACTIVITY Week of November 26 - December 2, 2006

	WEEK			28 DAY PERIOD			YEAR TO DATE			2 YR		PREVIOUS WEEK		PREVIOUS 28 DAYS	
	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2005	2006	% change	2004	% change	2005	% change	2005	% change
MURDER	0	0	0.0%	0	3	300.0%	3	6	100.0%	12	-50.0%	0	0.0%	0	300.0%
RAPE	0	0	0.0%	6	6	0.0%	9	15	66.7%	3	400.0%	0	0.0%	0	600.0%
ROBBERY	3	0	-300.0%	3	3	0.0%	51	54	5.9%	69	-21.7%	0	0.0%	0	300.0%
AGG ASSAULT	6	12	100.0%	18	21	16.7%	135	153	13.3%	186	-17.7%	3	300.0%	9	133.3%
BURGLARY	0	0	0.0%	9	3	-66.7%	75	81	8.0%	81	0.0%	0	0.0%	9	-66.7%
LARCENY	0	9	900.0%	3	12	300.0%	207	216	4.3%	246	-12.2%	3	200.0%	15	-20.0%
AUTO THEFT	0	0	0.0%	6	6	0.0%	57	57	0.0%	66	-13.6%	0	0.0%	9	-33.3%
TOTAL PT I ARRESTS	9	21	133.3%	45	54	20.0%	537	582	8.4%	663	-12.2%	6	250.0%	42	28.6%
SIMPLE ASST	21	36	71.4%	96	93	-3.1%	1248	1257	0.7%	1995	-9.9%	18	100.0%	126	-26.3%
GUN	3	0	-300.0%	15	6	-60.0%	108	84	-22.2%	93	-9.7%	0	0.0%	6	0.0%
PROSTITUTION	0	0	0.0%	18	0	-1800.0%	135	105	-22.2%	222	-52.7%	0	0.0%	39	-3900.0%
NARCOTICS	3	39	900.0%	18	63	250.0%	681	939	37.9%	783	19.9%	0	3000.0%	60	5.0%
D/C - BOP	15	12	-20.0%	69	78	13.0%	1032	1107	7.3%	1029	7.6%	36	-66.7%	120	-35.0%
OTHER	6	15	150.0%	42	60	42.9%	831	831	0.0%	1065	-22.0%	12	25.0%	36	66.7%
TOTAL ALL ARRESTS	57	114	100.0%	303	354	16.8%	4572	4905	7.3%	5250	-6.6%	72	58.3%	429	-17.5%

IV. Investigations and other Crime-Fighting Issues

Investigative work, the search for and arrest of perpetrators of past crimes, is also one of the most effective ways to prevent future crimes. Robberies, burglaries and auto thefts are usually committed by repeat offenders, each of whom may commit multiple offenses in the course of a year. The fact that Oakland had more than 3,600 robberies in 2006 does not mean that city has 3,600 robbers. The number of active robbers is probably no more than a couple of hundred and may be substantially less than that. Systematic efforts to identify pattern crimes (i.e., two or more crimes where the method of operation indicates the same criminal is responsible), and then to identify, arrest, and imprison the criminals can significantly reduce the robberies, burglaries and auto thefts in the city.

Some murders and much street violence are also susceptible to interdiction by investigation. Recent research on urban street killings and shootings indicates that the number of active shooters, even in very violent neighborhoods, is not that high. With good detective work, by properly staffed and focused detective units, shooters can be incarcerated and retaliation shootings can be headed off. The work takes an exacting attention to detail and a fierce determination to stop the bloodletting in the streets. Detective work is sometimes belittled as "reactive investigations" by some community policing ideologists, but, competent investigations are a vitally important part of any police department's proactive strategy to drive down crime. Investigations can save the lives of innocent victims who might otherwise be caught in a crossfire and remove from neighborhoods the small number of shooters who force parents to keep their children from playing in public spaces. Measured by the benefits it can bring to communities, good investigative work is community policing.

The Harnett Associates consultant team happens to have wide experience in detective work. Both Mr. Harnett and Mr. Roscnzweig have served many years as detectives and detective supervisors. Mr. Harnett was an NYPD detective for ten years before heading the NYPD's Crimestoppers Unit and its Major Case Squad. As chief of the

NYPD Narcotics Division in the 1990s, he reorganized narcotics investigations to eliminate hundreds of locally based drug gangs that caused much of the crime and violence in the city. Mr. Rosenzweig was a narcotics investigator and detective supervisor during his years with NYPD and conducted and supervised many investigations involving violent narcotic cartels and individuals. As chief investigator for Manhattan District Attorney's office, he oversaw units that were responsible for dismantling violent street gangs and also led the successful investigation of several famous cold cases. While acknowledging some outstanding individual investigative efforts in the Oakland Police Department, Mr. Harnett and Mr. Rosenzweig believe that OPD investigative units require substantial increases in staffing as well as considerable refocusing.

Understaffing in CID

The Criminal Investigation Division is significantly understaffed, and this understaffing has the following consequences based on 2006 crime reports in Oakland:

- Ten homicide investigators to investigate more than 140 annual homicides.
- Eight assault investigators to investigate more than 3,000 felony assaults.
- Seven robbery investigators to investigate more than 3,600 annual robberies.
- Four burglary investigators to investigate more than 7,000 annual burglaries.
- One auto theft investigator to investigate more than 7,500 annual auto thefts.
- A sergeant and six police officers to conduct investigations of narcotic offenses in a city reputed to have dozens of entrenched drug-dealing enterprises.
- A sergeant and six police officers to conduct gang investigations in a city where gang activity is on the steep rise and is said, by the department's homicide lieutenant, to be responsible for as much as 40 percent of the 2006 increase in homicides.

Given the disproportion of these numbers, the lieutenants who manage the department's investigative units are forced to triage cases, assigning for investigation only those cases that present a very strong probability of being solved. It is impossible to know how many of the unassigned cases might have been solved, how many leads might have

developed or how many additional pattern crimes might have been prevented if the larger proportion of these cases were systematically investigated.

In the current structure of OPD, all 10 of the homicide investigators are sergeants. Given the scale of the homicide problem in Oakland, additional investigators of police officer rank should be transferred to this very understaffed unit. The general practice of using sergeants and investigators should also be reviewed and consideration given to establishing a detective rank or designation in the OPD with the eventual goal of assigning sergeants to supervisory roles in investigations.

Investigative Workload

Even working at the numerical disadvantage described above, however, investigative work in the department could be better focused and more engaged. As is the practice in many California police departments, investigators have the responsibility of processing and packaging uniformed patrol arrests for the prosecutors. This responsibility tends to involve unnecessary duplicative work that adds little or no value to many of the cases the investigators are assigned to enhance. Several years ago, Los Angeles significantly reduced the paperwork burden on its detectives in negotiation with the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office. Similar negotiations should be opened in Oakland. In an interview with Mr. Harnett, Alameda County District Attorney Tom Orloff expressed a willingness to work with investigative supervisors to review and revise procedures in certain categories of cases to save time for investigators and improve their efficiency.

The consultants also recommend that some investigators should be working weekends and evening hours to provide a timely initial investigative follow-up to serious crimes during the hours when most of the crime in Oakland occurs.

Using Investigative Techniques

Although they have the capability to present photo arrays of digital photographs of previously arrested persons to victims of robbery and other serious crimes, as an initial investigative technique, consistently showing photos is not the practice of Oakland

investigators. Rather, photo arrays are prepared and shown only when specific suspects have already been identified. While not every victim can make identifications from photographs, some victims can, and it is a valuable initial step, especially in robberies or other pattern crimes to show photos to victims to establish leads to the identities of the perpetrators.

Likewise, Oakland's current inability to promptly process suspect fingerprints through Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), whether this work is done in-house or contracted out, is critically disabling to the department's ability to effectively investigate burglary and other pattern crimes (including robbery and auto theft) that are frequently committed by repeat offenders.

Recent advances in ballistic identification technology (NIBIN) allow investigators to quickly identify bullets fired from the same weapon and to thereby determine whether a single weapon was used in more than one shooting, which is frequently the case. When guns are recovered, especially as a result of an arrest, the timely comparison of the recovered weapon to ballistic materials recovered from past homicides, shootings and even from scenes where shots are fired and no one is struck can provide valuable information to investigators working these cases. Ballistic evidence is of particular importance in gang and other youth homicides and shootings because victims and witnesses in these incidents often refuse to cooperate with the police, and ballistic evidence sometimes provides the only leads. Yet, Oakland currently has only one ballistic examiner who is facing a backlog of ballistic material in connection with 57 homicide cases and 213 attempted murder and felony assault cases.

More criminals could be arrested by the effective use of recent advances in law enforcement technology such as DNA, NIBIN, AFIS and electronic mug-shot databases, but the Oakland Police Department is not using these technologies to full advantage.

Debriefing arrestees, i.e., the questioning of arrestees not only about their own case but also but other outstanding cases and to gather general criminal intelligence, has proven to be an extremely effective investigative tactic in the NYPD and other police departments.

Debriefing misdemeanor arrestees by the NYPD, for instance, has provided evidence and leads in homicide, gun trafficking and narcotics cases. Currently, OPD has one investigator who successfully debriefs arrestees at the county jail as they are processed. The consultants recommend a review of current debriefing procedures and expansion of debriefing to include throughout the department.

Narcotics Investigations

Although local narcotics businesses and local drug gangs contribute to much of the crime and violence in Oakland, the department has allocated very limited resources to deal with the problem. Narcotics investigations should be conducted with a strategic emphasis that links the cases to acts of violence and violent street gangs or individuals. Random targeting by narcotics investigators in New York City and other jurisdictions has proven to be very *ineffective* in terms of improving public safety. The CRT teams in each district can address street narcotics conditions that are often an important issue of community concern, but there is only one narcotics team to deal with the labor-intensive work of dismantling violent Oakland-based drug gangs that are behind the street dealers. Additional narcotics investigators are needed to focus on local drug gangs, especially those involved in violence.

- Immediately expand the Homicide Unit. Assign additional police officers with some investigative experience (from the ranks of the Special Operations Group, the Crime Reduction Teams, and the Internal Affairs Division) who can then be trained by the experienced homicide investigators. Maintain an elevated level of staffing at least until homicides subside to 2005 levels.
- Evaluate the practice of having sergeants function as investigators and explore alternatives, including the separate rank or designation of detective. The department might experiment with adding detectives to the homicide unit and partnering them with the current investigative sergeants who can begin to supervise and mentor them, even at a one-to-one ratio. The eventual goal would be to replace the sergeants with designated detectives and to establish a one-to-five or one-to-six supervisor-to-investigator ratio, though such a transition may require multiple years.

- Open discussions within the department and with the Alameda County District Attorney about how best to reduce the case-processing paperwork burden on Oakland Police Department investigators. Seek to streamline the paper process and remove investigators altogether from the processing of some arrests.
- Staff the weekday and weekend evening shifts with four investigators, two in the East and two in the West, who respond to crimes committed during these hours.
- In consultation with the Alameda County District Attorney's office, establish a policy and procedure for victims in all appropriate cases to view digital photo arrays and make it as easy as possible for them to do so. Train investigators in the skills of sorting digital photos by arrestee characteristics, creating digital photo arrays for victims to view, and documenting which photos are shown.
- Make a thorough assessment of the staffing shortages in Criminalistics Division and develop a plan to complete critical DNA, NIBIN, and AFIS casework in the timely fashion by hiring additional staff and outsourcing casework as necessary.

V. Organizational Change Template

A police organization can rarely be successfully changed by a couple of edicts from on high. Many attempts at organizational change in police departments have failed because the organization's leaders thought it sufficient to issue new marching orders without making much effort to engage the organization's middle management (i.e. its captains and lieutenants), or its supervising sergeants and its rank and file in the change process. For the Oakland reorganization to take genuine effect, really change the way the organization operates and turn the department into an effective crime-fighting team, the planning process should be inclusive and empowering.

- The Chief of Police should lead the change process. At the outset, in communications to the department, he should share his vision for a restructured and reinvigorated department committed to information-led community policing within the proud tradition of service and sacrifice in the Oakland Police Department, so evident from the wall of honor in the Headquarters' vestibule.
- The Chief of Police should assign a working group, possibly led by his designee for the Chief of Operations post and composed of chiefs, captains and possibly select lieutenants, to develop the neighborhood-policing plan. The group should determine the number and size of the districts, based on pertinent data, including calls for service, Part 1 crime, population, geographical area size, and recognized neighborhood boundaries. They should also develop a detailed staffing plan based on existing resources. As additional personnel become available, the plan should become the template for deployment. This working group should be exempt from other duties while working full-time to develop the department's plan of action, including developing strategies to deal with any and all perceived impediments to implementing an effective geographically-based police plan.
- The Chief of Police should critically review and challenge the assumptions of the working group's plan. The chief should have the working group present the proposed plan for review and critique by the remainder of the executive staff. Subject to these critiques, the chief should finalize the plan.

- Present the plan at an off-site retreat or working meeting with all ranking officers (lieutenants and above) in attendance. Allow full debate of the plan and adjust plan elements as necessary, consistent with overall goals of planning process.
- Do not assign the roles that each individual deputy chief, captain or lieutenant will play in the new plan until the plan has been finalized. All participants should be able to maintain an open mind about how the plan will be staffed without considering their own interest and assignment.
- Consider changing some of the longstanding nomenclature in the department to emphasize the lasting nature of the change. For instance, the HQ captain should not be referred to as "the watch commander," and crime reduction teams might be more accurately referred to as "conditions units."
- Present the plan to the department's sergeants at a sergeant's meeting, emphasizing the intention to have captains and lieutenants play a greater role in managing patrol, dealing with discipline and use-of-force cases, and driving the department to higher performance against crime.
- The Chief of Police should arrange a presentation of the plan to the leadership of the Police Officers Association.
- Present the plan to the rank and file at a series of line-ups. This should be a professional presentation that respects and persuades this audience. Support these presentations with a printed brochure that clearly explains the plan's rationale and major features.
- Present the plan to the Mayor and the City Council, and then to the public with deputy chiefs, captains and lieutenants making presentations at community meetings. Support these presentations with a more elaborate brochure or group of brochures that shows each community who their go-to captain and lieutenants are, including photographs, phone numbers and e-mail addresses.

It may seem implausible that the kind of internal structural reorganization recommended in this report could have a dramatic impact on such tangible external problems as killings, shootings, and robberies. Nevertheless, it can. More than most bureaucracies, police departments are dependent on their human resources, and it is only by motivating and focusing these resources that a department's productivity can be increased. In police

departments that lack focus and drive, it is almost always the case that the top managers of the organization have been structurally removed from the business of crime fighting. Re-engage them and you take a giant step toward re-engaging the department as a whole. You also gain the added benefit of increased job satisfaction among workers who will trade an often frustrating and unsatisfying paper chase for a fulfilling fight against crime. Andy Rosenzweig of the consulting team tells the story of how he and the Providence chief of police were approached by a Providence Police Department lieutenant some 12 months into the department reorganization in Providence. "Thank you," the lieutenant said to the police chief, "for giving me my career back."